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the persistence of or inducing change in the economic and institutional environment.
In this paper, we address these issues by modeling the joint evolution of institutions
and culture. In doing so, we place the various hypotheses of economic divergence
into one, unifying framework. We highlight the role that cultural transmission plays
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1 Introduction
Around the year 1000 C.E., the Muslim Middle East was far ahead of Christian Western
Europe in terms of socio-economic development. By the dawn of the industrial period (circa
1750), however, the Middle East severely lagged behind along several dimensions, including
technology, innovation, literacy, wages, and financial development (Bosker, Buringh and
Van Zanden 2013; Kuran 2011; Mokyr 1990; Özmucur and Pamuk 2002). In the course of
the medieval and early modern periods, economic institutions in the Middle East failed to
keep pace with those of the West. This is what Timur Kuran calls the Long Divergence
(Kuran 2011).
Several attempts to explain the Long Divergence have recently been put forward. Kuran
(2011) highlights the inability of the Muslim world to create or adopt those fundamental
commercial and financial institutions which were responsible for significant socio-economic
growth in the West, such as banking, the corporation (and corporate law), and institutions
supporting impersonal exchange. Kuran (2011) identifies the root cause of Middle East
stagnation in the religious legal system (Islamic law or Sharia) in governing all human
activities, including economic activities. He argues that certain aspects of Islamic law,
such as its inheritance system and partnership law, placed impediments that were difficult
for economic actors to overcome, especially as the world changed and opportunities for long-
distance exchange flourished. As Islamic law remained the law of the land in most of the
Muslim world well into the 19th century, these religious proscriptions retarded the region’s
economic growth. Rubin (2017) stresses the role of the political power conceded to Muslim
religious authorities due to their ability to provide legitimacy to rulers.1 He argues that
this power was used to block important socio-economic advancements, a leading example
being the printing press. In Europe, on the other hand, where the Catholic Church had a
much weaker legitimating role, novel ideas and reforms spread more quickly (thanks also to
the printing press), the economic elite developed laws and policies that portend economic
1Legitimacy is defined as the degree to which individual citizens believe they have a moral obligation to
obey the ruler. The study of political legitimacy has a long history in the social sciences. Perhaps most
famously, Weber (1947) defined political legitimacy as either charismatic, traditional, or legal-rational.
Our definition follows more closely in the footsteps of the definition of political legitimacy employed by
Lipset (1959, p. 86): “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing
political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.” For similar definitions of
political legitimacy, see Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009), Greif and Tadelis (2010), Rubin (2017), and Greif
and Rubin (2020).
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success, and long-run economic growth resulted.2 Blaydes and Chaney (2013) concentrate
on the different role of leadership in the Muslim world and Western Europe. In particular,
they argue that the relative weakness of Western European rulers, who had to rely on
feudal institutions for tax collection and military recruitment, led to a balance of power
more favorable to local (feudal) elites, which turned out to promote economic growth in
the long run. Muslim sultans, on the other hand, relied much more on centralized power,
derived in large part due to their access to slave soldiers, to satisfy both fiscal and military
needs. This limited the political power of economic elites and instead furthered the socio-
economic power of religious elite.
Several common themes underlie all these explanations. Fundamentally, economic
growth in Western Europe and the Middle East is seen as the outcome of the development
of institutional and technological progress brought about or hindered by the interactions
between rulers and elites—clerical and secular elites in particular. These explanations have
taken us far in explaining the reversal of economic fortunes between Western Europe and
the Middle East. Yet, each of these explanations raises a new set of puzzles. Consider
first Kuran’s explanation of how the persistence of religious proscriptions and the use of
religious law can slow economic growth. Muslim rulers must have understood this. Why,
then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promote inefficiencies?
The answers to these questions are not obvious from Kuran’s framework. Or, consider
explanations focusing on the role religious legitimacy plays in dampening economic growth
(Kuru 2019; Platteau 2017; Rubin 2017). Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
are religious and thus care about what religious authorities dictate. Why then, given that
religions carry with them economic proscriptions, do people remain religious, and thereby
yield religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity and religious identity a cause or a con-
sequence of institutional arrangements? These questions are left unanswered in theories
2Platteau (2017) and Auriol and Platteau (2017) present a related theory of political divergence between the
Christian and Islamic worlds, stressing the role of the centralization of Christian religious institutions and
the decentralization of Islamic religious institutions. They argue that this entails that Islamic rulers have to
co-opt the marginal cleric, leaving out the more radical clerics from the political decision-making process.
Chaney (2016) makes a related argument, noting that the relative fall of Islamic science coincided with the
rise of the madrasa system, which was a reflection of the increasing power of the religious establishment
in politics. Kuru (2019) likewise argues for the importance of the religion-state alliance in determining
long-run economic and political outcomes in the Middle East. He dates the rise of this alliance to the 11th
century, when the madrasa system came to prominence. Relatedly, Iyigun (2015) argues that because Islam
and Christianity are both monotheisms in which there is “one true god”, existential (and political) conflict
was more likely to arise between states following the two religions than between states with polytheistic
gods.
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focusing on legitimacy. Finally, consider the role that slave soldiers played in constraining
Middle Eastern rulers and, on the other hand, the greater constraint placed by the feudal
elite on European rulers (Blaydes and Chaney 2013). The logic of this argument is that
greater unchecked power of Muslim rulers meant they had less incentive to delegate power
to local elites, who could more effectively provide revenue but wanted rights in return. One
question that arises from this logic is that if Muslim rulers were sufficiently powerful, why
should they have been afraid to delegate tax collection to (non-religious) elites? A ruler
with a (near) monopoly on violence should not fear such elites, and he could increase tax
revenue by delegating power to them.
In this paper we account for these puzzles, while generating new insights, with a styl-
ized model of the joint dynamics of culture and institutions. In doing so, we elucidate
the historical mechanisms which might have contributed to the divergent growth paths of
Western Europe and the Middle East since the late medieval period. The fundamental
abstract dynamics of culture and institutions in the model are the result of three basic
elements, as in Bisin and Verdier (2017). First, institutions represent the relative political
power of different groups in civil society to affect policy decisions, and institutional change
is a mechanism to internalize externalities and other distortions characterizing the equi-
librium. Second, the cultural profile of values and preferences in society evolves according
to socio-economic incentives. Third, interdependence between institutions and culture is
the fundamental factor determining their joint dynamics and their effects on economic
performance.
The logic of our model is as follows. Legitimacy is an indirect choice of the ruler. She
might want to delegate part of her political power to clerics, obtaining in turn religious
legitimacy through the services provided by clerics to the religious component of civil so-
ciety. These services in turn shape and control civil society’s moral beliefs. The ruler,
therefore, by delegating to the clerics and obtaining legitimacy, internalizes an externality
which facilitates her ability to govern civil society. Since this externality operates through
the religious component of civil society, its extent is related to the relative size of this
component, and hence to the religious composition of society. The ruler’s incentive to
delegate to religious authorities also depends on the degree to which religious proscriptions
dampen economic activity. Although greater proscriptions decrease the size of the param-
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eter space in which a theocratic equilibrium arises, they limit economic development in
that equilibrium.3
The socio-economic dynamics of society depend on the complementarity of culture and
institutions. Institutional change delegating power to the clerics reinforces the incentives of
religious individuals to transmit their cultural values, increasing their relative share in the
population. A higher fraction of religious individuals in the population in turn augments
the political incentives for the ruler to delegate power to clerics to increase legitimacy.
The resulting joint dynamics of culture and institutions in this society display two types
of stationary states: a theocratic regime where clerics have strong political power and the
share of religious individuals in the population is high (in spite of religious proscriptions
on economic activity); and a secular regime where clerics have little political power and
the share of religious individuals is low.
Projecting this general abstract framework into the most prominent accounts of the
socio-economic dynamics of Western Europe and the Middle East in the period from ap-
proximately 1000–1800 C.E., we model the socio-economic policy interactions of rulers,
clerics, and civil society in a religious environment. Our base model accounts for two
features central in the literature on the long divergence (and the economics of religion
literature more generally): i) rulers derive legitimacy from the religious elite (Auriol and
Platteau 2017; Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin 2012; Coşgel and Miceli 2009; Kuru 2019; Lewis
1974, 2002; Platteau 2017; Rubin 2011, 2017); and ii) religious authorities impose proscrip-
tions that impinge on economic development (Berman 2000; Carvalho 2013; Iannaccone
1992; Kuran 2001, 2005, 2011; Seror 2018). In this context, we study whether different
initial conditions and parameters of the model could generate distinct dynamic growth
paths, converging to distinct stationary states, interpreted to represent Western Europe
and the Middle East over the period 1000–1800 C.E. We also study whether the pattern of
institutional formation and the spread of culture (religious beliefs) implied by the model
is consistent with stylized facts which identify the histories of the regions in this period.
We extend the model to account for a third key feature of Middle Eastern and Western
European political and economic development: constraints on executive power and the de-
3Religious proscriptions can have welfare-enhancing features. For instance, Iannaccone (1992) shows how
seemingly inefficient sacrifice and stigma common among religious groups can serve as a mechanism to
enhance commitment within the group. For a theoretical treatment of religious proscriptions, see Seror
(2018). However, these welfare-enhancing features are inherently limited to smaller religious groups, since
this entails that the non-committed do not join the religious “club.” In this paper, we are concerned with
mainstream religions that do not have this feature.
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centralization of political power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 2019; Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson 2005b; Blaydes and Chaney 2013; Mann 1986; North and Weingast 1989;
Tilly 1990). We show how a society’s political centralization interacts with religious legit-
imacy and religious proscriptions to determine its long-run economic and political paths.
While political decentralization can increase tax revenue by placing constraints on exec-
utive power (Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Dincecco 2009; Johnson and Koyama 2017;
North and Weingast 1989), it may come at the cost of undermining the efficacy of religious
legitimacy. We further extend the model to consider the role of religion and religious legiti-
macy in innovation and technological change. Our model is consistent with recent theories
which argue that culture (Davids 2013; Mokyr 1990, 2010, 2016; White 1972, 1978), and
religious proscriptions in particular (Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2015, 2020; Coşgel,
Miceli and Rubin 2012; Squicciarini 2020) can inhibit technological change.4
Our framework not only accounts for the long-run economic divergence between West-
ern Europe and the Middle East, but it also accounts for the puzzles raised by each of the
prevailing explanations. People remained religious in the face of religious proscriptions—a
puzzle raised by the works of Kuran (2011) and Rubin (2017)—because there is feedback
between religious institutions and cultural evolution. As institutions evolved so that re-
ligious legitimacy became more important, cultural values spread (optimally) throughout
the population that were complementary to these institutions. Likewise, the model ex-
plains why Muslim rulers did not decentralize power to local elites, even though they had
a near monopoly on violence and should not have feared these elites. Doing so would have
reduced the power of religious authorities and could have triggered cultural evolution to-
ward a more secular society. Given the significant legitimating power of Muslim religious
authorities, this equilibrium was suboptimal from the perspective of Muslim rulers. In
short, by combining the three prevailing theories in one unifying framework and by intro-
ducing the interaction between cultural and institutional evolution, our model clarifies the
logic underlying the primary puzzles raised by the literature while providing many new
insights.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model. Section 3 solves
the model and presents key propositions. Section 4 presents extensions to the model, and
Section 5 concludes.
4In is certainly not the case that religion and religious proscriptions always have a negative impact on
economic development. See Barro and McCleary (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2019) for an overview
of the literature and a theory of the positive associations between religion and economic development.
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2 Ruler, clerics, and civil society
Consider a society populated by there are three types of agents: a ruler, clerics, and civil
society. Civil society is composed of two types i of citizens: religious individuals (i = Re)
in proportion q, and secular individuals (i = S) in proportion 1− q. Citizens work. Total
production is qeRe + (1− q)eS, where ei, i = Re, S is the per capita work effort generated
by an individual of type i. The ruler lives off taxing civil society at a tax rate τ . The tax
base which the ruler has access to is the total production of citizens: E = qeRe + (1− q)eS.
The ruler also builds and maintains religious infrastructures, m, for the clerics to provide
religious services. The total religious services provided for the society are αc m, where αc
is the effort of the (representative) cleric. The building of religious infrastructures has cost
C(m) that the ruler pays for. On the other hand the clerics pay for the daily maintenance
costs F (m) of these infrastructures.5
The fundamental mechanism in the model, which induces a role for legitimacy, is the
assumption that the provision of religious services facilitates governance and obedience for
religious individuals. We capture this by assuming that religious individuals, when taxed
by the ruler, subjectively perceive a tax rate τ eRe smaller than the actual τ chosen by the
ruler and decreasing in the religious effort of the clerics, αc:
6
τ eRe = τ(1− θαc). (1)
The parameter θ represents the efficiency of the “legitimizing” technology of the clerics.
Likewise, θ can be interpreted as the efficiency of religious legitimacy in encouraging com-
pliance with authority (or, similarly, discouraging tax evasion) (Coşgel and Miceli 2009;
Greif and Rubin 2020). For secular individuals, τ eS = τ .
On the other hand, religious services have an indirect cost, by imposing proscriptions
(i.e., regulations and constraints) on individual behavior for both religious and secular
individuals. We capture this effect by assuming that the cost of individual production
5These costs are assumed to be increasing in m and sufficiently convex to satisfy a regularity condition,
needed to ensure that when religious clerics have a high political weight λ in the institutional structure,
the policy problem associated to institutional design is well behaved, and provides a finite equilibrium
provision of m.
6See Wintrobe (1998) for a model of loyalty to the leader affecting taxation levels (via its affect on tax




c(αc)Φ(ei), with Φ(ei) =
e2i
2
and c(αc) = 1 + φαc, i = Re, S. (2)
The parameter φ > 0 represents the degree of restrictiveness of religious prescriptions on
economic activities.
The ruler has utility
Ur(m) = τE − C (m) .
Clerics derive utility αc m from religious services, at effort cost Ψ(αc). The utility of the
clerics therefore is
Uc(m,αc) = m · αc −Ψ(αc)− F (m).
Finally, the utility of individuals in civil society is
Ui(ei) = ei(1− τ ei )− c(αc)Φ(ei), i = Re, S.
increasing and convex in their argument. We assume the cost functions C(.), F (.) and Ψ(.)
are increasing and convex in their argument.7 We denote τ̄ the maximum feasible tax rate
which the government can impose.
The model captures the key parameters of two of the three prevailing theories of the
“Long Divergence”: religious legitimacy (θ) and religious proscriptions (φ). In Section 4.1,
we will extend the model to account for the third theory: constraints on executive power
(Blaydes and Chaney 2013). In what follows, we analyze how these parameters affect
equilibrium outcomes and the joint dynamics of culture and institutions.
3 Equilibrium and dynamics
We study equilibrium in the society we have outlined in the previous section. We also
study the joint dynamics of cultural values and institutions in this society, which we will
define precisely and operationally.
At any time t society reaches an equilibrium of a game between the ruler, clerics,
and civil society. At equilibrium, (we postulate that) policy is chosen to maximize a
social welfare function which weights the political power of the ruler, the clerics, and
the civil society. The policy choice and the choices of the (representative) cleric and the
7We also assume that F ′(m) < C ′(m) for all m > 0 i.e., that the marginal cost of infrastructure maintenance
is smaller than the marginal cost of building infrastructures.
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(representative) member of each type of civil society are taken non-cooperatively with
respect to each other. This is to model a policy choice environment which is plagued
by lack of commitment, whereby the policy maker is not allowed to pick the policy in
advance of the choices of the economic agents. Formally, the societal equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium of the simultaneous game between agents and the policy maker.
Institutional change is modeled as the outcome of commitment mechanism which, by
delegating power across political groups in society, can affect future policies chosen to
maximize social welfare (see Bisin and Verdier 2017). Cultural dynamics are modeled as
purposeful inter-generational transmission through parental socialization and imitation of
society at large (Bisin and Verdier 2001, 2017).
3.1 Equilibrium
The policy choice is the amount of religious infrastructures m. It is collectively chosen to
maximize the social welfare function W , which encodes the relative power of the groups
as weights. The relative power of the ruler is fixed (to 1
2
).8 The power of the clerics and




. The social welfare function to be maximized by










[qURe(eRe) + (1− q)US (eS)] . (3)
The ruler, clerics, and citizens choose, respectively, τ , αc, and ei, i = Re, S to maximize
their utility.
The policy choice m, and the choices of τ , αc, and ei, i = Re, S, constitute a Nash
equilibrium, denoted {τ(λ),m(λ), αc(λ), eS(λ), eRe(λ)}.9 At equilibrium, the optimal tax
rate τ(λ) is equal to its maximum possible value τ . As the ruler has a higher political
weight that the citizens, taxation is fully extractive. In order to simplify notation, we write
τ instead of τ̄ = τ(λ) in the rest of the paper. The comparative statics at equilibrium are
summarized in the following Lemma.
8This is just for simplicity and concreteness. All that is needed is that the ruler has a large enough power
with respect to the other members of society.
9The equilibrium is fully characterized in the Appendix. Since there is a complementarity between the
provision of the religious good m and the investments of the clerics in religious infrastructures αc, the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is not guaranteed. Under mild conditions, however, the equilibrium is
uniquely determined.
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Lemma 1 Religious infrastructures: The optimal investment in religious infrastruc-
tures, m(λ), and the optimal effort of the clerics, αc(λ), are increasing in λ and independent
from θ and φ.
When the weight of the clerics in social choice increases, so does the marginal benefits
of provisioning the religious infrastructure m. In turn, the clerics increase their own effort




both αc(λ) and m(λ) increase with λ.
In the model, clerics do not derive utility from imposing proscriptions on economic
activity nor from legitimizing the ruler. Hence, the investment in religious infrastructure
m(λ) and the provision of the religious services αc(λ) are independent from θ and φ.
Lemma 2 Labor effort: The effort of secular individuals eS(λ) is decreasing in λ and φ
and is independent from θ. On the other hand, as long as θ ≥ φ(1−τ)
τ
, the effort of religious
individuals eRe(λ) is increasing in λ and θ, and is decreasing in φ.
When the efficiency of the clerics to legitimize the ruler θ increases, so does the effort of
religious individuals who subjectively perceive a lower tax rate. By contrast, the efficiency
of the legitimizing technology has no effect on the effort of secular individuals. An increase
in the degree of restrictiveness of religious proscriptions, φ, leads to lower efforts from both
the religious and secular individuals, as harsher proscriptions decrease individuals’ labor
productivity.
The political weight of the clerics affects the labor efforts through αc(λ), the equilibrium
effort of the clerics. While more effort from the clerics αc(λ) makes secular individuals
reduce their own labor effort—through costly regulations and prohibitions φ—when θ ≥
φ(1−τ)
τ
, clerics have the opposite effect on the labor effort of religious individuals eRe. This
is because when clerics provide more effort, the religious individuals perceive a lower tax
rate. Despite the costly religious regulation, they increase their effort in the face of higher
investments in religious infrastructures. In order to make this key difference between secular
and religious individuals stark, we make the following Assumption:
Assumption 1 θ ≥ φ(1−τ)
τ
.
We denote the tax base as E(λ) = qeRe(λ) + (1 − q)eS(λ). From the two previous
Lemmas, we deduce the following result:
9
Lemma 3 Tax base: The tax base is increasing in q and θ, and is decreasing in φ. It
increases with λ as long as q ≥ φ(1−τ)
τθ
.
While religious infrastructures increase the scope of religious proscriptions, they also
positively affect the effort of the religious individuals under Assumption 1. Hence, when
religious individuals are sufficiently numerous, the latter effect dominates, and the tax base
E(λ) increases with the effort of the clerics αc(λ), so it increases with λ. Similarly, since
θ positively affects the labor effort of religious individuals, it also positively affects the
tax base. Religious proscriptions φ negatively affect the tax base, as they decrease labor
efforts. The tax base increases with the fraction of religious q, who provide greater effort
than their secular counterparts.
3.2 Institutional Dynamics
Institutional change at each time t is represented by the choice of the relative power to be
delegated to clerics and civil society in the future; that is, the choice of λt+1 from the point
of view of the social welfare function with weight λt.
10 More formally, at any time t, given











[qtURe(eRe(λt+1)) + (1− qt)US (eS(λt+1))] . (4)
Institutional change operates as a commitment mechanism by delegation which internal-
izes two externalities that are not taken into account by individual decisions in equilibrium.
The first one relates to the fact that the provision of religious infrastructure m grants legit-
imacy to the ruler by reducing the subjectively perceived tax rate for religious individuals.
The second is the fact that it also has a depressing effect on labor productivity. Hence,
more provision of the religious good m not only affects the utility of the clerics, but also
feeds back into the utility of both the ruler and the citizens. Solving the optimization
problem (4), we obtain the following result:
10We assume that institutional design is myopic. That is, institutions are designed for the future as if
they would never be designed anew in the future. This implies that an institutional structure does not
internalize institutional “slippery slopes,” whereby moving to a different structure of decision rights may
in turn trigger subsequent institutional changes leading to undesirable outcomes from the point of view of
the initial structure. See Bisin and Verdier (2017) for a discussion of how this issue can be accounted in
the model.
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Proposition 1 The optimization problem (4) admits a unique solution λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. The
solution is characterized by a threshold q(λt) ∈ [0, 1] such that,
λt+1 > λt (resp. ≤), if qt > q(λt)(resp. ≤).
Furthermore, the threshold q(λt) is decreasing in θ and increasing in φ.
The uniqueness result follows from the convexity of the optimization problem. Whether
more power is delegated to the clerics over time depends on the fraction of religious in-
dividuals qt. If the religious are sufficiently numerous, then a larger weight to the clerics
λt+1 > λt increases their effort αc(λt+1). This in turn increases both the utility of the ruler
Ur—who benefits from a larger tax base (Lemma 3)—and the total welfare of the citizens
qtURe+(1−qt)US. Civil society can also benefit from higher effort from the clerics—despite
religious proscriptions—as religious individuals are better off when they perceive a lower
tax rate.
Relative to the comparative static results, when the strength of religious proscriptions φ
increases, so does the cost for the ruler of using religious legitimacy as a means of extracting
resources from the population. The parameter space over which λt increases shrinks as q
increases. On the other hand, when clerics are efficient at legitimizing the ruler, i.e. when
θ increases, then delegating power to the clerics is more beneficial and q decreases.
3.3 Cultural dynamics
Cultural dynamics are modeled as purposeful inter-generational transmission (Bisin and
Verdier 2001, 2017), through parental socialization and imitation of society at large. Direct
vertical socialization to the parent’s trait i ∈ {Re, S} occurs with probability di. If a
child from a family with trait i is not directly socialized, which occurs with probability
1−di, he/she is horizontally/obliquely socialized by picking the trait of a role model chosen
randomly in the population.11 The probability Pij that a child in group i is socialized to
trait j writes as:
Pii = di + (1− di)qi
Pij = (1− di)qj;
(5)
11See Bisin and Verdier (2011) for a survey of the economic literature on cultural transmission. Vertical,
horizontal, and oblique transmission are the core mechanisms in the dual-inheritance theory of cultural
evolution. For more, see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985), and Henrich
(2015).
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with qRe = q and qS = 1 − q. We assume that the probability of direct socialization di is
the solution of a parental socialization problem in which: a) parents are paternalistic (i.e.,
imperfectly altuistic) and have a bias for children sharing their own cultural trait, b) such
paternalistic bias writes as ∆Vi(λt) = Vii(λt) − Vij(λt), where Vij(λt) = Ui(ej(λt)) is the
utility perceived by a type i parent of having a type j child, for i, j ∈ {Re, S} and j 6= i, c)
parents of type i ∈ {Re, S} have socialization costs that are increasing and convex in di,
d) religious infrastructures mt may act as complementary inputs to the transmission effort
dRe of religious families in the socialization of children to the religious trait.
As shown in the appendix, in such a set-up, the dynamics of the proportion of the
population with the religious trait is characterized by the following ”cultural replicator”
dynamics:
qt+1 − qt = qt(1− qt){d∗Re − d∗S}. (6)
where d∗Re = DRe [(1− qt)∆VRe(λt),m(λt)] is the equilibrium socialization effort of a reli-
gious parent, and an increasing function both in (1 − qt)∆VRe(λt) and m(λt). Similarly
d∗S = DS [qt∆VS(λt)] is the equilibrium socialization effort of a secular parent, and an
increasing function of qt∆VS(λt). In equation (6), the term
D(qt, λt) = d
∗
Re − d∗S = DRe [(1− qt)∆VRe(λt),m(λt)]−DS [qt∆VS(λt)]
can be interpreted as the relative “cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population.
This term is frequency dependent (i.e., it depends on the state of the population qt). It
is also affected by the institutional environment λt, as this variable interacts with the
process of parental cultural transmission both through paternalistic motivations ∆Vi(λt),
and through the provision of religious infrastructures mt = m(λt) as a complementary
input to religious family socialization. We deduce the following result:
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold q∗(λt) such that
qt+1 < qt (resp. ≥) if qt > q∗(λt)(resp. ≤).
Furthermore, the threshold q∗(λt) is increasing in θ and λt and decreasing in φ.
Because the process of cultural transmission (5) is characterized by cultural substitution
between vertical and oblique transmission, the relative “cultural fitness” of the religious
trait D(qt, λt) is decreasing in the frequency qt of religious individuals in the population
12
(Bisin and Verdier 2001). Consequently, the proportion q∗(λt) such that D(q
∗(λt), λt) = 0
is the unique attractor of the cultural dynamics in (6). When the fraction of religious
individuals qt is above (resp. below) q
∗(λt), then it decreases (resp. increases) in order to
converge in the direction of q∗(λt).
The dependence of the threshold q∗(λt) on the institutional environment λt and com-
parative statics on the parameters θ and φ depends on how the relative “cultural fitness”
D(qt, λt) of the religious trait is affected by changes in such features.
An increase in the political weight of the clerics λt affects cultural transmission in two
ways, through its effect on socialization incentives ∆VRe(λt) and ∆VS(λt) and through its
effect on religious infrastructures, m = m(λt). On the one hand, an increase in λt promotes
the clerics’ effort αc(λt) and consequently leads to a lower perceived tax rate τ
e
Re by religious
individuals. The labor effort choice of religious and secular individuals is therefore further
apart and, consequently, the incentives of parents to socialize their children to their own
cultural trait, ∆VRe(λt) and ∆VS(λt), are larger in both groups.
12 However when the
socialization effort of religious parents is more sensitive to these incentives than the effort
of secular parents, the religious trait is relatively more successfully transmitted than the
secular trait, and D(qt, λt) is shifted up with an increase in λt. On the other hand, an
increase in λt also increases the amount of religious infrastructures m = m(λt). When such
infrastructures enter as complementary inputs in the socialization process of the religious
trait, then again religious parents tend to socialize more intensively than secular ones when
m increases. The religious trait has consequently higher cultural fitness than the secular
trait and again D(qt, λt) is shifted up with λt. In either situation, the diffusion of the
religious trait is favored by an increase in λt, and q
∗(λt) becomes larger.
A change in the other parameters θ and φ affects the relative cultural fitness of the
religious trait only through their induced changes on the paternalistic motives ∆VRe(λt)
and ∆VS(λt). For instance, a higher efficiency of the clerics θ tends to widen the gap
between the optimal work effort of a religious individual compared to that of a secular
individual. As a consequence, an increase in θ shifts up both ∆VRe(λt) and ∆VS(λt).
As mentioned above, when religious parents are more sensitive to paternalistic motives
than secular parents, these shifts lead religious parents to socialize more intensively than
secular parents, and religious values are passed from generation to generation with a higher
intensity. This results in a higher value of q∗(λt). Conversely, a higher value of religious
12Given the quadratic specification of the utility function Ui(ei), and substituting the optimal labor efforts




, which is increasing in λt.
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proscriptions φ dampens the impact of work effort on economic outcomes. Consequently,
behavioral differences induced by cultural traits are less relevant from a utility point of
view. This in turn reduces the paternalistic motives ∆VRe(λt) and ∆VS(λt) of religious
and secular parents. The effect of a change in proscriptions φ on cultural evolution is then
qualitatively the opposite of that of a change in θ.
3.4 Joint dynamics of culture and institutions
Under the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2, we can represent the joint cultural and
institutional dynamics in the phase diagram of Figure 1. The black line represents the
threshold of the institutional dynamics q(λt). The dotted line represents the threshold
q∗(λ) associated with the cultural dynamics. The arrows in Figure 1 depict the joint
dynamics of culture and institutions, given our results in Propositions 1 and 2.












The joint dynamics of culture and institutions in this society display two steady states.
The first could be characterized as a theocratic regime represented by point A in Figure 1,
where the ruler is legitimized by religion, the clerics have significant political power (λ is
high), taxation is high (the tax rate τ is maximal and the tax base E is high), and the share
of religious individuals in civil society is high (q is high). The second steady state, point B
in Figure 1, could be characterized as a secular regime where the ruler is not legitimized
by religion, clerics have little political power (λ is zero), taxation is limited (the tax rate
τ is maximal but the tax base E is small), and civil society is secular (q is small). Two
mechanisms characterize the dynamics.
Complementarity. In regions I and IV of Figure 1, the ruler’s option to rely on religious
legitimacy to increase tax capacity induces a fundamental complementarity of the dynam-
ics of culture and institutions. Committing to an institutional set-up delegating power
to the clerics reinforces the incentives of the religious individuals to transmit their values
inter-generationally. In turn, a predominance of religious individuals in civil society aug-
ments political incentives to commit and change the institutional set-up so as to empower
the clerics. Complementarity operates to produce dynamics converging to the theocratic
regime, as represented by point A in Figure 1 or to the secular regime, as represented by
point B.
Transitory paths. In regions II and III of Figure 1, the dynamics are not characterized
by a complementarity. In region II, for example, religious individuals are insufficiently nu-
merous and λt decreases over time. At the same time, religious values grow: as the religious
trait is not widespread, religious individuals invest more in direct socialization (Bisin and
Verdier 2001). Depending on the speed of institutional change relative to cultural change,
the joint dynamics can either reach region I or region IV. Region II is a transitory path
to the theocratic equilibrium when the religious population grows fast despite the political
weight of the clerics decreasing over time. In this case, religious individuals become suffi-
ciently numerous at some point that the course of institutional change is reversed, and the
political power of religious clerics starts to grow after a transitory period.
In region III, religious individuals are sufficiently numerous for the political power of
the religious clerics to increase over time. But the religious population is too large, so
secular individuals invest more in direct socialization. Again, depending on the speed
of institutional change relative to cultural change, either region I or region IV could be
reached by the joint dynamics. If the religious population decreases faster than religious
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institutions grow, we can expect the joint dynamics to reach region IV. In this case, the
religious population becomes so low after a transitory period that the political weight of
the clerics decreases over time and equilibrium B is reached in the long-run.
Proposition 3 Joint dynamics of culture and institutions: The likelihood of reach-
ing the theocratic equilibrium is increasing in religious legitimacy θ and decreasing in the
level of religious proscriptions φ.
Proposition 3 combines the results established in our analysis of the institutional
and cultural dynamics (Propositions 1 and 2). A higher efficiency of the clerics θ—by
definition—decreases the subjectively perceived tax rate of the religious. As a conse-
quence, religious parents have a higher willingness to transmit their cultural values inter-
generationally. At the same time, clerics become more important in the institutional
apparatus, as they increase social welfare by (i) lowering the perceived cost of effort and
(ii) increasing the rents extracted by the ruler. Therefore, the complementarity between
the spread of religious values and institutional changes delegating power to the clerics is
reinforced when θ is higher.
At the opposite end, when religious proscriptions φ increase, the cost for the ruler from
using religious legitimacy as a means of extraction increases. The threshold q(λt) also
increases. Similarly, more religious proscriptions makes the religious trait less resilient,
as the threshold q∗(λt) associated with the cultural dynamics decreases. This explains
why the complementarity between the spread of religious values and institutional changes
delegating power to the clerics is weakened.
3.5 The historical stylized pattern
In the historical context we study—Western Europe and the Middle East over the period
1000–1800—the literature has proposed three key differences between the regions. Our
model, so far, can account for two of these three differences. The first is that Muslim
religious authorities had greater capacity to legitimate (i.e., higher θ) than their Christian
counterparts. This was due to the environment in which the religions were born. Chris-
tianity was born in the Roman Empire and was in no position to legitimate the emperor.
Early Christian doctrine is reflective of the low legitimating capacity of Christianity (Feld-
man 1997; Rubin 2011). For instance, Jesus famously said “Render unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22:21). Meanwhile,
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Islam formed conterminously with expanding empire, and there are numerous important
Islamic dictates specifying the righteousness of following leaders who act in accordance
with Islam (Hallaq 2005; Rubin 2011, 2017). Although early Islamic rulers claimed to have
religious authority vested in themselves (Crone and Hinds 1986), after the religious estab-
lishment consolidated in the ninth century (Coşgel, Miceli and Ahmed 2009), and certainly
after the rise of the madrasa system in the 11th century (Kuru 2019), religious authorities
were the primary agents capable of determining whether rulers acted in accordance with
Islam.
Second, economically-inhibitive religious proscriptions existed in both Christianity and
Islam, but were more pervasive and persisted for much longer in the latter (i.e., φ is higher
in Islam). For instance, Kuran (2005, 2011) cites how Islamic law regarding partnerships
and inheritance combined to discourage long-lived or large business ventures. Partnerships
would be split among numerous heirs upon the death of any partner, any of whom could
dissolve the enterprise. Another well-known set of proscriptions are those related to usury,
which existed in both Islam and Christianity, but persisted for much longer in the former
(Noonan 1957; Rubin 2011, 2017). More generally, Islamic law covers numerous aspects of
commercial life, but it was formulated in the first few centuries of Islam. While Islamic law
did change over time to address economic exigencies, this change was slower than changes
that occurred to secular law in Europe (Berman 1983; Hallaq 1984, 2005).
Our model describes how differences in these two key parameters, θ and φ, may have af-
fected the institutional, cultural, and economic trajectories of the Middle East and Western
Europe. These parameters affect the dynamics induced by the complementarity of culture,
q, and institutions, λ. In one equilibrium, which as Proposition 3 states may arise from
high θ or low φ, the dynamics are characterized by the reinforcement over time of religious
legitimacy, power of the clerics, and diffusion of religion in civil society. In the historical
context we are interested in, this was roughly the situation in Western Europe following the
fall of the Roman Empire. The Germanic “follower kingdoms” were not initially ruled by
Christians, although the Roman population had largely become Christianized in the fourth
and fifth centuries. This provided strong incentive for Germanic rulers to either convert to
Christianity or promote Christianity.13 In other words, rulers seeking legitimacy in a high
q environment chose to employ religious legitimacy as a key component of their right to
rule (even if θ was not as high as it was in the Islamic Middle East).
13One of the most important cases is the conversion of the Frankish king Clovis (r. 481–509), who employed
Christianity to legitimize his Frankish expansion into new territory (Tierney 1970, Rubin 2017, pp. 62–63).
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The “high q, high λ” equilibrium characterized Western Europe until the 11th cen-
tury, when the re-birth of commerce gave rise to independent cities and increased tensions
between the religious and secular elite (Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer 2020; Rubin
2011). The rebirth of commerce entailed that religious proscriptions (φ in our model), such
as the ban on usury, were more economically harmful. In the absence of widespread trade
prior to the Commercial Revolution, such proscriptions had little dampening effect on the
economy. Yet, they became increasingly harmful as trade flourished (Rubin 2011). The
increase in φ combined with the relatively low θ of Christian religious authorities encour-
aged rulers to break with the Church as a key means of legitimation. The most important
event in this break was the Investiture Controversy (1075–1122), a conflict between various
secular rulers and the papacy over the role of the former in religious affairs. The Investiture
Controversy culminated in European rulers seeking alternative justifications for their rule
(i.e., lowering λ) (Tierney 1988, pp. 33–95). They found these alternative justifications
in the universities, where leading scholars provided justification for secular rule based on
Aristotelian thought, while others helped codify various branches of secular law such as
merchant law, feudal law, and manorial law (Berman 1983; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014;
Hollenbach and Pierskalla 2020). Indeed, Blaydes, Grimmer and McQueen (2018) find that
it was precisely in this period that European political advice texts began to de-emphasize
religious appeals. As a whole, these events helped place much of Western Europe on a path
towards the more “secular” equilibrium described in our model, in which there is little role
for religious authorities in legitimating political rule, with more political power resting in
civil society.
The complementarity between culture and institutions was exacerbated by the Refor-
mation, which further decreased the political power of the clerical elites. In England, Greif
and Rubin (2020) find that following the Reformation, the political power of religious au-
thorities dropped significantly and the law (as formed in Parliament) became a key source
of royal legitimacy. In Germany, Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman (2018) find that, fol-
lowing the Reformation, there was a massive reallocation of resources and education from
religious to secular purposes. In other words, where the Reformation undermined the po-
litical power of the Church (i.e., lowered λ), less cultural capital was invested in religious
pursuits.
In the Muslim Middle East, a “high q, high λ” equilibrium emerged a few centuries
after the initial spread of Islam and persisted (with ebbs and flows) until the present day.
Islam spread quickly, reaching Spain in the west and the Indian subcontinent in the east
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within its first century. The “Islamic world” was not thoroughly Muslim for a century
or two after the initial spread of Islam (i.e., it had low q), and it first spread along trade
routes before spreading into other Muslim-controlled territory (Michalopoulos, Naghavi and
Prarolo 2016, 2018). After the first Caliphate (632–661), whose rulers were companions
of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunni successor empires (the Umayyad Empire (661–750)
and the Abbasid empire (750–1258)) employed Islamic religious authorities to legitimate
rule, provide jurisprudence, and administer imperial rule.
In the context of our model, these early empires were in region II of Figure 1: they had
relatively high λ but low q. In this region, either a secular or theocratic equilibrium can
arise in the long run, depending on the relative speeds of institutional and cultural change.
In the historical context, institutional change away from a strong clerical class was slow
to arise. The reason was that, despite the initially low q, religious authorities provided
stability and essential services. After the religious establishment consolidated in the eighth
and ninth centuries, they were able to provide legitimacy by providing judgments and new
interpretations of law that supported the state (Hallaq 2005; Rubin 2017). Over time,
the Muslim population grew (i.e., q increased), and the religious elite were also able to
provide legitimacy by associating the ruler’s name with piety. As a result, a “theocratic
equilibrium” emerged in the long run.
Two examples from two different periods and regions highlight the reinforcement of
Muslim institutions and culture in a “high q, high λ” world. First, Chaney (2013) finds
that Egyptian religious authorities were more secure in their rule (e.g., higher λ) when the
Nile flooded or there was a drought. This is precisely when a ruler would most need religious
legitimacy, both because the tax base would be lower and because there was a greater threat
of revolt. Moreover, this was a period of increasing Islamization of the Egyptian population
(i.e., q was increasing). Saleh (2018) finds evidence of massive conversions of lower socio-
economic status Copts into Islam: by 1200, Muslims were 80% of the Egyptian population,
and by 1500 they were over 90% of the population.14 Combined, these two studies reveal a
“high q, high λ” equilibrium, with cultural and institutional forces reinforcing each other.
A second example comes from the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, where the
population had largely converted to Islam centuries prior to Ottoman expansion (i.e., q
was high). In the late 15th century, the Ottomans brought the religious establishment into
the state, establishing the office of the Grand Mufti (chief religious jurist). This gave the
14Saleh (2018) argues that negative selection among Copts was due to the poll tax that non-Muslims had to
pay; those that could not afford it simply converted to Islam.
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Ottomans significant power to formulate controversial decisions in a manner consistent with
Islam (Imber 1997). Meanwhile, the reinforcement of institutions and culture strengthened
after the Ottomans conquered the Egyptian Mamluk Empire (in 1517) and took control
over Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities of Islam. This further enhanced the capacity
of clerics to confer legitimacy by associating the ruler with Islamic piety (e.g., mentioning
the name of the legitimate ruler in each Friday sermon or supporting obedience to the ruler
in judicial rulings) (Hallaq 2005, ch. 8). Thus, the high level of religious legitimacy (θ)
provided by Muslim clerics resulted in a “high q, high λ” equilibrium for much of Ottoman
history.
Hence, our model squares two of the leading theories of the “Long Divergence.” It sug-
gests that the diverging long-run paths of these economies of the two regions—“high q, high
λ” in the Middle East and “low q, low λ” in Western Europe—were in part a result of the
relatively high efficacy of religious legitimacy (θ) in the Islamic world. This meant that the
two regions had different responses to religious proscriptions (φ). In Western Europe, once
commerce revived in the 11th and 12th centuries, religious proscriptions were sufficiently
economically damaging to push society on the path that ultimately resulted in a low q, low
λ equilibrium. On the other hand, in the Islamic world such religious proscriptions may
have been even more economically damaging at the time, given that the Islamic world was
ahead of Europe. However, the relatively high θ in Middle Eastern societies meant that a
high q, high λ equilibrium persisted in spite of the relatively high religious proscriptions
(φ) of Islam. These insights therefore unify Kuran’s theory emphasizing religious proscrip-
tions with theories emphasizing religious legitimacy (Kuru 2019; Platteau 2017; Rubin
2017). Kuran’s theory is not just that religious proscriptions existed in Islamic law, but
that they persisted for so long after they were useful. Meanwhile, an emphasis on religious
proscriptions reveals why legitimating arrangements changed over time (in Europe). More
importantly, it sheds light on why the relative economic stagnation of the Middle East
occurred in spite of the welfare-enhancing properties of religious legitimacy.
So far, our model does not account for the third major theory of the long divergence:
Middle Eastern rulers had more unconstrained power relative to other elites. Blaydes and
Chaney (2013) ascribe the relatively greater power of Middle Eastern rulers to their access
to slave soldiers, which gave rulers access to coercive power without ceding political power.
Meanwhile, weaker European rulers had greater incentive to negotiate with their economic
(i.e., feudal) elites for revenue and military power, since they had little capacity to rule
otherwise (Duby 1982). Throughout Europe, rulers also ceded power to urban burghers,
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who had relative freedom from imperial rule (Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer 2020;
Mann 1986; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Schulz 2020). More generally, this meant
that Muslim rulers had less constraint on their power, which a large literature suggests
is harmful for economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson 2005b; North and Weingast 1989; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; van Zanden,
Buringh and Bosker 2012). Our model does not permit the ruler to share power with other
elites that may constrain her, so it cannot speak to the conditions under which this occurs
in a high q, high λ environment. In the next section, we extend the model to consider how
political decentralization interacts with the various parameters of importance in our model
(namely, θ and φ).
4 Extensions
In this section we extend and enrich the model by considering the emergence of political
decentralization and technological progress. This will allow us to read more clearly the
historical evidence through the theoretical implications of our model.
4.1 Religious legitimacy and political decentralization
Pre-modern states tended to have little fiscal capacity or capacity to provide law and order
to regions far away from the capital. Administrative capacity tended to be quite weak
in most parts of the world, meaning that rulers could not easily implement their desired
policies (González de Lara, Greif and Jha 2008; Greif 2008; Ma and Rubin 2019). As such,
there was a limit to the potential tax revenue available to rulers that was well below the
optima on a Laffer curve (Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Dincecco 2009; Johnson and
Koyama 2017). This issue is (implicitly) central to the framework proposed by Blaydes
and Chaney (2013). Without the capacity to collect revenue on their own, pre-modern
rulers had to delegate tax collection to powerful people. Such powerful people could deter
tax evasion via force and more easily assess just how much taxable surplus an individual or
community had. The degree to which rulers had to delegate depended on their own power
vis-à-vis other elites. According to Blaydes and Chaney (2013), Muslim rulers had to
delegate less because they had access to slave soldiers. This meant they did not need local
elites for military service or, oftentimes, tax collection. Meanwhile, the feudal arrangement
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in medieval Europe was such that local taxes were collected by powerful people and in
return rulers received military service and, occasionally, tax revenue.
In this section, we model the interactions between rulers and powerful elites. We
consider a modified version of the previous model where political power is divided between
three groups: the ruler, religious clerics, and a secular elite (i.e., feudal lords, parliament,
or the military). We study the conditions under which the ruler decentralizes political
institutions by sharing political power with the secular elite, who has the capacity to
collect taxes.
We treat the secular elites as representatives of the citizenry. In terms of the distribution
of power between groups, we assign the “ruling coalition” the combined weight of the ruler




= 1 − λ
2
, in social welfare. This is similar to the baseline
model, with the citizenry being replaced by the secular elites. In other words, if the ruler
and the secular elites are the “ruling coalition” (as in North, Wallis and Weingast 2009),
then 1− λ
2
is the total weight of the coalition. The clerics have weight λ
2
and citizens have
no political power, that is, zero weight.15
The secular elite enforces tax compliance and it shares with the ruler the proceeds of
tax collection. The share of the tax revenues accruing to the ruler vis-a-vis the secular
elites is β ∈ [0, 1]. As a simple illustration, a regime where λ = 1 can be interpreted as a
theocracy, while λ = 0 is a dictatorship when β = 1, and a republic when β = 0, as the
ruler does not benefit from tax revenues. We denote αl ∈ [0, αl] the enforcement effort of
the secular elites, with αl > 0. Let µ
α2l
2
, µ > 0, be a quadratic cost associated with this
effort. The utility of the secular elites can be expressed as:




Consider now the utility of the ruler. We assume the ruler faces a cost ραl when letting
the secular elite enforce tax compliance αl. For instance, medieval European rulers provided
feudal lords with lands to administer. Tax enforcement was accompanied with the hiring
and building up of a force of violence by these lords. These elements suggest that the more
the ruler cedes to lords the power of tax enforcement, the larger is the military power of the
lords, which may eventually be turned against the ruler herself. The cost ραl is a simple
way to capture such threats. We maintain the assumption that the maintenance cost of
15This is a simplification to reduce the dimensionality of the dynamics of institutions while expanding the
qualitative features of the narrative of the interactions between ruler, clerics, and citizens we analyzed in
Section 3.
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religious infrastructures paid by the clerics is F (m). The utility of the ruler is then
Ur(m) = β(τE − C(m))− ραl;
and the utility of the clerics is
Uc(m,αc) = mαc − F (m)− ψ(αc).
We assume that citizens do not necessarily comply with tax collection. Let ε(αl) be
a measure of the capacity of tax enforcement on the part of the elites and c an (inverse)
measure of the capacity of individuals to evade taxes; so that an individual who does not
comply with tax collection faces an expected tax rate cε(αl). Specifically, we assume that
ε(αl) in increasing in αl and c is drawn from a uniform distribution on a segment [0, c],
with c > 0.16 The productivity of citizens is 1
1+φαc
, with φ being religious proscriptions.











with τRe = τ(1− θαc) and τS = τ .
Equilibrium: At any time t, society reaches an equilibrium of the game between the
ruler, clerics, secular elite, and civil society. The religious infrastructures m are collectively








The clerics and the secular elite choose, respectively, αc and αl. We denote {m(λ), αc(λ), αl(λ, β)}
the equilibrium. Solving the equilibrium, we obtain the following results:
Lemma 4 Religious infrastructures: The optimal investments in religious infrastruc-
tures m(λ) and the optimal effort of the clerics αc(λ) are increasing in λ, and independent
from β, θ, and φ.
16For analytical convenience, we assume ε(αl) =
ε0
1−αl ; so that ε0 ∈ (0, 1) is the enforcement level when
the secular elites are not providing an effort (αl = 0). For simplicity, we also assume that the maximum
enforcement level that the secular elite can undertake αl is less than 1− ε0, so that ε(αl) always lies in the
interval [ε0, 1].
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Lemma 5 Tax Enforcement: The optimal enforcement effort of the secular elite αl(λ, β)
is decreasing in β, λ, q, θ and φ.
Lemma 4 is similar to Lemma 1 in the previous model and has the same intuition.
Lemma 5 highlights several results. First, when the ruler receives a larger share of the
tax revenues β, the secular elite invests less in enforcing tax collection. Second, since
individuals subjectively perceive a lower tax rate when clerics provide more effort, they
also comply more with taxation, reducing the need for the secular elite to supply their
own enforcement effort. Additionally, more effort from the clerics implies more religious
proscriptions, which depress citizens’ labor productivity, and decreases the proceeds of the
tax collection. This also decreases the effort provided by the secular elite in enforcing the
tax collection. Hence for both reasons, the clerics’ legitimizing effort αc, and the secular
elite tax enforcement effort αl are strategic substitutes with respect to building up the tax
base of society. Consequently, given that clerics provide more effort when they are more
powerful (i.e. when λ is higher), the secular elite is conversely less willing to enforce the
tax collection in such a case: (i.e αl(λ, β) decreases with λ).
The same intuition explains both the effect of a higher frequency q of religious individ-
uals and of more efficient clerics θ on the effort of the secular elite αl. Finally, when the
religious proscriptions φ get stronger, then the proceeds of the tax collection are reduced,
so the secular elite also provides less tax enforcement effort.
Institutional Dynamics. We may now extend the main model with regards to the
structure of political weights across society. The ruler can delegate power to the clerics λ
and also constrain herself to share more revenues with the secular elites by decreasing her
own fraction β of fiscal revenues.
Institutional change internalizes two types of externalities that are not taken into ac-
count by equilibrium individual decisions. First, as in the previous model, the religious
provision m grants legitimacy to the ruler by reducing the subjectively perceived tax rate
of religious individuals, while at the same time depressing labor productivity because of
religious proscriptions. Second, institutions now also respond to the externality implied
by the enforcement effort αl of the secular elite on the fiscal revenue received by the ruler.
By committing to share the proceeds of the tax collection, the ruler can indirectly induce
a higher fiscal capacity for his own benefit.
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Hence, given the current institutional structure (λt, βt), future institutions (λt+1, βt+1)











with {m(λt+1), αc(λt+1), αl(λt+1, βt+1)} denoting the equilibrium of period t, as evaluated
under an institutional set-up (λt+1, βt+1). Solving this optimization problem, we deduce
the following results which characterize the institutional dynamics:
Proposition 4 When C(m) and F (m) are sufficiently convex, the optimization problem
(10) admits a unique solution (λt+1, βt+1) ∈ [0, 1]2 and:
There exists a threshold qd(λt) ∈ [0, 1] such that if qt > qd(λt), then λt+1 > λt. Otherwise,
λt+1 ≤ λt. Moreover qd(λt) is decreasing in λt.
There exists a threshold q̃d(λt, βt) ∈ [0, 1] with q̃d(λt, 1) = 1 such that if qt > q̃d(λt, βt),
then βt+1 > βt. Otherwise, βt+1 ≤ βt. Morever the threshold q̃d(λt, βt) is decreasing
in λt and increasing in βt.
The uniqueness result follows from the convexity and the separability of the two di-
mensions of the optimization problem (10). As before, whether the ruler delegates more
power to clerics over time depends on the fraction of religious individuals qt. If the religious
are sufficiently numerous, then more weight to the clerics λt+1 > λt increases their effort
αc(λt+1). This will increase the utility of the ruler, who benefits from a larger tax base
(Lemma 4). Second, when the religious are sufficiently numerous, the political weight of
the secular elite relative to the ruler tends to decrease, βt+1 > βt. As the ruler becomes
more reliant on religious legitimacy to raise revenues, he also faces weaker incentives to
delegate power to the secular elite and to build fiscal capacity.
Cultural Dynamics. As before, cultural evolution is driven by some process of inter-
generational transmission emanating from paternalistic parents and oblique social role
models. The formal features of the cultural dynamics need, however, to be amended to
the new specification of citizens’ preferences and the fact that parents now internalize
that their children will have their own evasion capacity c. Again one may compute the
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paternalistic motives ∆VRe and ∆VS to transmit the religious and the secular trait in this
context. As shown in the appendix, due to the quadratic specification of the expected
payoff functions, these simply write as function of the state variables λ, β, q such that
∆VS = ∆VRe = ∆V (λ, β, q).
17 The dynamics of the frequency of the religious trait is again
characterized by the following “cultural replicator” dynamics:
qt+1 − qt = qt(1− qt)D(qt, λt, βt). (11)
where again
D(λt, βt, qt) = d
∗
Re − d∗S
= DRe [(1− qt)∆V (λt, βt, qt),m(λt)]−DS [qt∆V (λt, βt, qt)]
is the relative “cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population, and in general
depends now on the three state variables λ, β, q. When the cultural substituability between
vertical and oblique transmission is strong enough, the relative “cultural fitness” of the
religious trait D(λt, βt, qt) is decreasing in the frequency qt of religious individuals in the
population and we deduce the following result:
Proposition 5 With strong enough cultural substitution between vertical and horizontal
cultural transmission, there exists a unique threshold q∗d(λt, βt) such that
qt+1 < qt (resp. ≥) if qt > q∗d(λt, βt) (resp. ≤) .
As before, the threshold q∗d(λt, βt) is the unique attractor of the cultural dynamics (11).
Hence, when the fraction of religious individuals qt is above (resp. below) the threshold
q∗d(λt, βt), it tends to decrease (resp. increase).
Joint Dynamics. The joint dynamics of culture and institutions in this society are
now three dimensional: the two institutional parameters λt, βt and the cultural component
qt, evolve jointly, as characterized in Propositions 4 and 5. A full characterization of
this dynamic system is difficult. Still one can get some insights on the forces behind the
17Because the equilibrium tax collection effort αl(λ, β, q) of the secular elite enters into the paternalistic
motives, we may note that ∆V (λ, β, q) now also depends on q and is actually an increasing function of q
(see the appendix).
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joint dynamics by investigating how the thresholds qd(λt), q̃d(λt, βt) and q
∗
d(λt, βt) that
characterize respectively the dynamics of λt, βt and qt are themselves affected by these
state variables.
As in the benchmark model, there is again a fundamental complementarity between
the dynamics of culture and institutions. To see that, note first that because qd(λt) is
decreasing in λt, from Proposition 4, the political weight of the religious clerics λt keeps
increasing (resp. decreasing) over time as soon as it is above (resp. below) a threshold
λ(qt) defined by qd(λ) = qt. A strong (resp. weak) clerics’ institutional representation is
reinforced (resp. weakened) over time. This feature creates a force towards an institutional
steady state characterized by a theocratic institutional regime with λ = 1, or on the contrary
a secular institutional regime with λ = 0. Also, given that the threshold λ(qt) is decreasing
in qt, the reinforcing dynamics for the theocratic institutional regime are facilitated (resp.
weakened) when the religious (resp. secular) trait is already well disseminated in society.
Conversely, from Proposition 5, q∗d(λt, βt) is increasing in the institutional weight λt of
the clerics. As before, a theocratic institutional regime with a high value of λt stimulates
more religious infrastructures and reinforces the incentive of religious individuals to pass
their values inter-generationally. Religious values are more widely diffused within a theo-
cratic institutional regime, while secular values widely prevail under an secular institutional
regime.
With respect to the dynamics of political centralization βt, Proposition 4 reveals that
βt is more likely to increase as qt and λt become larger. Indeed, as the threshold q̃d(λt, βt)
is increasing in λt and βt, the condition for βt+1 − βt ≷ 0 rewrites as βt ≶ β̃d(λt, qt) with
β̃d(λt, qt) increasing both in λt and qt. This feature underlines a force for the system to
move in the direction of a steady state level of political centralization β̃∗d that is increasing
both in the level of institutional power λ of the clerics, and the extent q of religious values
prevailing in the society. The more theocratic the state and the more diffused the religious
values in the population, the larger the religious legitimacy enjoyed by the ruler, and the
lower the need to empower the secular elite for fiscal consolidation.
Qualitatively, the previous discussion indicates that the joint dynamics of culture and
institutions entails to the possibility of two steady states. The first is a theocratic regime
with political centralization, where the ruler has a strong say on fiscal revenues (β is high)
and is legitimized by religion, while the clerics have significant political power (λ = 1).
Fiscal capacity is low, as the secular elite have minimal incentives to enforce tax collection.
The share of religious individuals in civil society is also high (q is high). The second steady
27
state is a secular regime with political decentralization. The ruler is fiscally weak while
the secular elite is strong (β is low). The clerics have little political power (λ = 0), while
fiscal capacity is high given that secular elites have now strong incentives to enforce tax
collection. At the same time, the share of religious individuals is low (q is low).
In the appendix, we show that the previous discussion can be made analytically more
precise in the case where the threshold of the cultural dynamics q∗d(λt, βt) does not depend
on βt. The dynamics of λt and qt are then decoupled from the dynamics of βt and follow
the same pattern as in the benchmark model. Depending on the initial conditions (λ0, q0),
(λt, qt) converge towards a theocratic regime (1, q
∗
d(1)) or a secular regime (0, q
∗
d(0)) . As-
sociated with these dynamics, political centralization then converges towards strong state
centralization with β∗1 = β̃d(1, q
∗
d(1)), or weak state centralization β
∗





As in the benchmark model, a ruler’s option to rely on religious legitimacy induces a
fundamental complementarity between the dynamics of culture and institutions. When a
ruler relies more on religious legitimacy to raise revenues, she also faces increasingly lower
incentives to delegate power to the secular elite and to consolidate fiscal capacity. As she
becomes fiscally stronger relative to the secular elite, she also commits to an institutional
set-up delegating more power to the clerics, leading to an increased diffusion of religious
values in the society. In turn, the predominance of religious individuals augments the
political incentives to bias the institutional structure towards both the clerics and the
ruler. This dynamic complementarity between institutions and culture then operates to
produce a process converging towards a theocratic regime with political centralization.
Alternatively, when a ruler relies less on religious legitimacy to raise revenues, she
also faces stronger incentives to delegate power to the secular elite, who consequently
consolidates fiscal capacity. As the ruler becomes more reliant on her secular elite to collect
taxes, she accordingly faces lower incentives to commit to an institutional set-up where
religious clerics are powerful. Both the political weight of the clerics and the value of passing
religious values inter-generationally decrease. A lower predominance of religious individuals
in society and a lower legitimacy to raise taxes directly further augments the political
incentives to consolidate fiscal capacity by empowering the secular elite. Eventually, the
joint dynamics of culture and institutions converge towards a secular regime with political
decentralization.
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4.2 The historical stylized pattern
This extension allows us to unify the three main theories of the “long divergence.” It takes
seriously the idea that rulers can be constrained by other powerful elites in society and
searches for the conditions under which this is likely to happen. Importantly, it does so
in the context of the previously-established framework in which religious legitimacy and
religious proscriptions play a role in determining the joint evolution of institutions and
culture. But how do our findings accord with the historical record?
We first consider the relationship between constraint on executive power and fiscal
capacity. This relationship is central to the extension proposed in Section 4.1. There is a
large literature claiming that states in which fiscal capacity and the “power of the purse” are
held by groups outside of the central executive are able to collect more taxes due to greater
constraints on executive power (Besley and Persson 2009; Dincecco 2009; Karaman and
Pamuk 2013; Ma and Rubin 2019; North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage 2011). Our model
adds additional insight to this literature by shedding light on the process through which
political decentralization, as we define it, engenders cultural change (i.e., secularization)
that reinforces the state’s fiscal capacity. One of our primary insights is that rulers will only
decentralize political authority when the returns from religious legitimacy (via taxation)
are sufficiently low. This in turn triggers cultural change to a more secular society. On
the contrary, when society is religious, the returns from religious legitimacy may be high
even when religious proscriptions impinge on productive effort. In this case, culture and
institutions evolve in tandem and society becomes more religious over time.
Section 4.1 highlights multiple reasons why European political institutions became de-
centralized in the medieval period. First, following the fall of the Western Roman Empire,
European rulers had relatively little fiscal power relative to other elites. In the terms of
our model, their initial level of β was low. This also follows from the framework of Blaydes
and Chaney (2013). They argue that European rulers were weak relative to other elites
because they lacked access to independent sources of military power, unlike Muslim rulers
who could employ slave soldiers.
However, as we noted in the introduction, an explanation relying solely on executive
constraint leaves a major question unanswered. If Muslim rulers were so strong relative
to other elites, why should they have feared decentralizing some of their power to those
“secular” elites, which could have yielded more tax revenue? Even as late as the early
modern period, Ottoman tax collection was notoriously low (Karaman and Pamuk 2013).
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Why did the Ottomans not give more power to local notables, who would have almost
certainly had more capacity to collect taxes? These elites should not have been a threat
to Muslim rulers. After all, rulers had slave soldiers and local elites did not.
Our model provides insights which help solve this puzzle. It suggests that the ruler’s
fiscal power relative to other elites (β) interacted with the greater legitimating capacity
of Muslim religious authorities. Muslim rulers failed to decentralize political power not
because they feared that other elites would become too strong. They did so because
political decentralization would result in a weakening of the efficacy of religious legitimacy.
Granting more power to secular authorities would have encouraged a cultural shift to a
more secular state, yielding religious legitimacy less effective. Given the relative efficacy
of religious legitimacy, this would not have been an optimal strategy for a Muslim ruler.
This was exacerbated by access to slave soldiers, which gave the ruler more initial power
vis-à-vis other elites. However, as the model indicates, this relative power (β) changes
endogenously over time. Just because Muslim rulers had an initial advantage vis-à-vis
other elites does not explain why it persisted.
The opposite is true in medieval Western Europe. The relatively weak initial power of
rulers combined with the relatively weak legitimating capacity of the Church incentivized
rulers to decentralize political power. This ultimately yielded a secular equilibrium in
which religious proscriptions barely impinged on economic development.
These insights accord well with the historical record. Medieval European economic and
political institutions were highly decentralized. Feudal institutions gave lords—secular
lords as well as powerful bishops—great power over their local domains, and in return the
lords provided military service and tax revenue to their sovereign (Duby 1982). Over the
course of the late medieval and early modern periods, parliaments became the primary
institution which bargained with European rulers (Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer
2020; van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker 2012). Parliaments allowed the economic elite to
gain representation at the political bargaining table, and they generally included three
classes: the landed nobility, powerful churchmen, and commercial/urban elite. As warfare
became more expensive, European rulers ceded more to these elites, who could provide
them with revenue (Gennaioli and Voth 2015; North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage 2011;
Tilly 1990). Ultimately, parliaments became the main tool for constraining rulers, which
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resulted in a massive increase in fiscal capacity (Dincecco 2009; Johnson and Koyama 2017;
North and Weingast 1989; Tilly 1990; van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker 2012).18
On the other hand, in the Middle East economic power was decentralized but political
power remained centralized (Coşgel and Miceli 2005; Karaman and Pamuk 2013; Karaman
2009). For instance, at the height of Ottoman power in the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries, the sultan derived two-thirds to three-quarters of his revenue through the tımar
system, a military lease contract whereby the provincial cavalry collected agricultural taxes
directly from the peasantry as remuneration for their military services to the state (Coşgel
and Miceli 2005). The tımar system was similar to the tax collection system of feudal
Europe, where local feudal lords controlled revenues in return for military service. However,
a key difference between the two is that European feudal lords also had political power:
their families ruled over their domains for generations, providing local law and order,
collecting taxes, and representing them in parliament. On the other hand, tımar holders
were rotated every few years precisely so that they would not acquire local political power.
All political power remained vested in the sultan and key religious authorities, not tımar
holders. Unlike European elites, who were ultimately able to constrain their rulers and
receive concessions in return for revenue, tımar holders never organized collectively in
any manner close to resembling a parliament, and Ottoman rulers remained relatively
unconstrained (Balla and Johnson 2009). As a result, the economic elite rarely had any real
political power in the Ottoman Empire (Pamuk 2004a,b). Meanwhile, religious legitimacy
remained important (as discussed in Section 3.5), and as a result sultans ceded purview
over commercial law to religious authorities, and the associated proscriptions dampening
economic activity lasted for centuries (Kuran 2011).
This raises the question of how our model squares with Kuran’s insight that religious
proscriptions associated with Islamic law held the Middle East back. After all, Proposition
3 indicates that greater proscriptions should lead to a secular equilibrium, not a theocratic
one. While it is true that in some instances, religious proscriptions can strengthen religious
groups (Abramitzky 2008; Berman 2000; Iannaccone 1992), such groups are naturally lim-
ited in size. The mechanisms highlighted in this literature only work for smaller religious
groups like Protestant sects or ultra-Orthodox Jews. These are not the groups of interest
in the present paper. We are interested in the cultural evolution of the primary religious
groups in medieval Western Europe and the Middle East. So how do we square the fact that
18For a theoretical treatment of the rise of state capacity and its affect on economic development, see
Acemoglu (2005) and Besley and Persson (2009, 2010).
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Islam had relatively strong religious proscriptions with the fact that the historical equilib-
rium was closer to what we describe as “theocratic”? This is where the other parameters
in the model have bite. Our model suggests that the “theocratic” equilibrium that arose
in the Islamic world arose in spite of the relatively strong religious proscriptions imposed
by Islam. In a society with high θ, religious proscriptions were not enough to discourage
rulers from decentralizing power and thereby weaken religious authorities. This insight is
therefore consistent with Kuran, who focuses both on the religious proscriptions placed
by Islamic law and their persistence over time. Once the theocratic equilibrium became
established, religious proscriptions dampened economic activity in numerous unforeseeable
ways, as Kuran shows in great detail.
4.3 Religious legitimacy and technological progress
Another key driver of the long divergence was technological and scientific progress. Al-
though this is not highlighted in the central theories of the long divergence, nearly every
theory of Britain’s (and eventually Europe’s) industrialization asks why Britain eventually
became technologically advanced beginning of the 18th century (Allen 2009; Mokyr 1990,
2010, 2016). Although not all the advancements of the Industrial Revolution were science
based—especially inventions in textile production—many were (including the quintessen-
tial invention of the period, the steam engine). That Europe pulled ahead in science and
technology is puzzling: for centuries after the spread of Islam, the Middle East had a mas-
sive technological and scientific lead on Western Europe (Chaney 2016). What happened?
Why was there a reversal of scientific and technological fortunes between the two regions?
In this section, we extend the model to account for the role that the various parameters
of interest may have played in encouraging or stifling technological and scientific develop-
ment. Again, we consider an extended version of the model where political power is divided
between religious clerics and the ruler. But now, we study the conditions under which the
ruler allows an endogenous technological choice or adoption of a scientific innovation, which
is a source of productivity gains although it sometimes erodes religious beliefs.
More specifically, let the ruler and the clerics have political weights 1−λ and λ respec-
tively. Let also the parameter αI ∈ [0, αmax] denote a variable characterizing the technology
level of the society. We assume that the level of technology is a policy instrument bounded
by the knowledge frontier αmax.
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Given that our primary interest is to study the joint evolution of culture, institutions,
and technology, we consider again a reduced form model where the political power of the
citizens is set to zero. The ruler now has utility
Ur = τE − C(m);
and religious clerics have utility
Uc(m,αc) = mαc − F (m)− ψ(αc).
We now consider religious legitimacy as a function of technology. Specifically, the
religious legitimacy of the ruler, θ(αI) = θ0 − kαI , is a decreasing function of the level
of technology αI .
19 In other words, adoption of innovative and sophisticated technologies
erodes traditional religious beliefs where the ruler is seen as legitimate. This can be inherent
to the process of innovative or scientific discoveries, which question the relationship between
people and the natural world (Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2020; Mokyr 1990; Squicciarini
2020).20 Finally, we assume that labor productivity is proportional to the technology level:
a = αI .
As in the previous section, citizens do not necessarily comply with tax collection and
differ in their (inverse) evasion capacity c. We fix now the taxation enforcement measure
to ε0 < 1.
Equilibrium: At any time t, society reaches an equilibrium of the game between the ruler,
the clerics, and civil society. Following the same line of reasoning as in the previous section
(see the Appendix) the tax base of the economy is:
E = E(αI , αc, qt) =
αI
1 + φαc
{1− τ(1− qtθ(αI) · αc)
ε0c
}
19To avoid some cumbersome taxonomy, we assume that kαmax < θ0 < 2kαmax. The first inequality ensures
that religious legitimacy can always be produced at any potential technological level. The second inequal-
ity ensures that maximum knowledge αmax is sufficiently large not to always constrain the equilibrium
technology choice by society.
20Religious precepts are not always antithetical to scientific advancement. Indeed, White (1972, 1978) and
Davids (2013) argue that certain medieval European technologies were complementary to the Church’s
interest. For the sake of this extension, we focus on technologies that are antithetical to the interests of
religious authorities. Mokyr (1990) argues that this more often than not the case with new and disruptive
technologies.
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The policy choices, that is the religious infrastructure m and the technology level αI are
collectively chosen so as to maximize social welfare:
W = (1− λt)Ur(m,αI , αc, qt) + λtUc(m,αc); (12)
while the clerics choose αc. Solving the equilibrium:
αc = m, − C ′(m) + λαc = 0, (13)







The optimal choice of technology reflects the trade-off on the tax base of an increase in
labor productivity and the erosion of religious legitimacy provided by the clerics. It can
also be seen that the optimal level of technology αI (αc, qt) is decreasing in qt and in αc.
When the religious are more numerous and/or clerics undertake higher religious efforts,
the ruler is more reliant on religious legitimacy to raise revenues. Consequently, he is also
more reluctant to adopt innovative activities that may erode such legitimacy.
The solution to (13) and (14) provides the equilibrium values m (λt), such that C
′(m) =
λtm, αc (λt) = m (λt), and αI (λt, qt) = αI (m (λ) , qt).
Institutional Dynamics. We allow the ruler to delegate power to the clerics λ. Institu-
tional change again internalizes the externality that is not taken into account by individual
decisions in equilibrium. As in the benchmark model, the provision of religious infrastruc-
tures m grants legitimacy to the ruler by reducing the subjectively perceived tax rate of
religious individuals, while at the same time depressing labor productivity because of in-
creased religious proscriptions. As will be clear below, this interacts with the choice of
optimal technology adopted by society.




(1− λt) [Ur(m(λt+1), αI(λt+1), αc (λt+1) , qt)] + λtUc(m (λt+1) , αc(λt+1)) (15)
with {m(λt+1), αc(λt+1), αI(λt+1)} the equilibrium of period t + 1, as evaluated under the
institutional set-up λt. Solving this optimization problem, we deduce that:
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Proposition 6 The optimization problem (15) admits a unique solution (λt+1) ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, there exists a threshold qI(λt) such that
λt+1 > λt (resp. ≤) if qt > qI(λt) (resp. ≤).
As in the previous extension, the uniqueness result follows from the convexity of the
optimization problem (15). Whether the ruler delegates more power to the clerics over time
depends again on the fraction of religious individuals qt. If the religious are sufficiently
numerous, then religious legitimacy matters relatively more than technology for the ruler’s
tax base. Consequently, more weight to the clerics λt+1 > λt is provided, as this increases
their effort αc(λt+1). The ruler consequently benefits from a larger tax base.
Cultural Dynamics. As in the previous section, cultural dynamics are driven by inter-
generational transmission decisions from the citizens. Following the steps of the previous
section, we find the following result:
Proposition 7 There exists a unique threshold q∗I (λt) such that
qt+1 < qt (resp. ≥) if qt > q∗I (λt) (resp. ≤).
Furthermore, the threshold q∗I (λt) is increasing in λt.
The cultural dynamics are still as in (6) and the threshold value q∗I (λt) is their unique
attractor. Hence, when the fraction of religious individuals qt is above (resp. below) q
∗
I (λt),
it tends to decrease (resp. increase).
Joint Dynamics. There are two steady states. In the theocratic regime equilibrium, the
ruler is legitimized by religion. The clerics have significant power (λ is high) and religious
beliefs are widespread (q is high). For both reasons, the technology level implemented
in society is low, as this threatens the religious legitimacy generated in this theocratic
state. Because, innovation adoption and scientific activity is limited, labor productivity
is low, as are fiscal revenues despite extractive taxation. The second steady state is a
secular innovative regime where a high level of technology close to the knowledge frontier
is adopted. Clerics are weak, given that innovations limit their capacity to legitimate the
ruler (λ is zero) and the share of religious individuals is low (q is low). Fiscal revenues can
be substantial, given that a process of scientific innovation leads to an overall increase in
labor productivity.
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Complementarity. Again, a ruler’s option to rely on religious legitimacy induces a fun-
damental complementarity of the dynamics of culture and institutions. Along the path
towards a theocratic steady state, the ruler relies more on religious legitimacy to raise rev-
enues. She also faces increasingly lower incentives to adopt efficient innovations that erode
her legitimacy. The ruler then commits to an institutional set-up delegating an increasingly
large share of power to the clerics, reinforcing the incentive of religious individuals to pass
their values inter-generationally. In turn, this further decreases the incentive of the ruler
to adopt innovative technologies. Labor productivity stays low, given that technology is
limited. Finally, taxes are increasingly more extractive given that the population becomes
more religious but labor productivity remains low.
On the other hand, as a ruler relies less on religious legitimacy to raise revenues, she
also faces stronger incentives to adopt innovations that increase labor productivity and
consequently the fiscal base. As the ruler becomes more reliant on innovative activities to
raise revenues, her religious legitimacy erodes, so she faces less incentive to commit to an
institutional set-up where the religious clerics are powerful. Both the political weight of
the clerics and the value of passing religious values inter-generationally decrease. A lower
predominance of religious individuals further augments the political incentives to commit
and change the institutional set-up so as to adopt more efficient technologies, leading to
a substantial increase over time in labor productivity and fiscal revenues. Eventually, the
joint dynamics of culture and institutions converge to a secular regime where the imple-
mented technology is not constrained by political forces, but only by the existing knowledge
frontier.
4.4 The historical stylized pattern
One of the great mysteries of the long divergence is the reversal of fortunes between Middle
Eastern and Western European science and technology. Data presented in Chaney (2016)
reveals that not only were scientific topics among the most ubiquitous in the corpus of
Islamic writings up through the 11th century, but up to that point the Islamic world well
out-paced Europe in scientific output. At some point in the 11th and 12th centuries,
however, a reversal of fortunes occurred. Islamic scientific production began to wane
around the 12th century. This was not simply a matter of the Islamic world falling behind
relative to Europe; it fell behind in absolute terms relative to what it had once been. At
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the same time, scientific works became much more prevalent in Western Europe. By the
end of the medieval period, Western Europe had a technological and scientific lead, and
this would only grow in subsequent centuries. Can this reversal of fortunes be explained
by our model?
Our model, along with the history overviewed in Section 3.5, suggests that the rever-
sal of technological and scientific fortunes was a consequences of a changing equilibrium
in which Muslim religious authorities became increasingly important for legitimating the
state while European rulers sought alternative forms of legitimacy. In the Middle East,
the 11th century saw the rise of the madrasa system (Chaney 2016; Kuru 2019). This
institutionalized the political role that had increasingly been played by religious author-
ities since their consolidation under the Abbasids in the 9th and 10th centuries (Coşgel,
Miceli and Ahmed 2009; Rubin 2017). In this equilibrium, as we describe in Section 4.3,
religion played an important role in legitimating rule (λ was large), society was largely
religious (q was large), and science and technology were impeded. As in Bénabou, Ticchi
and Vindigni (2020), technological stagnation mutually benefited religious authorities and
the state: the former lost power when alternative means of discovering truths or inter-
preting the world were present, and the latter was harmed when one of its key sources of
legitimacy was undermined. In the context of Middle Eastern history, this logic sheds light
on both why madrasas were allowed to thrive in spite of their negative effects on scientific
production and why rulers throughout the Muslim world banned one of the most impor-
tant technologies of the late medieval period: the printing press. Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin
(2012) argues that the Ottomans banned the press for over 240 years after first hearing of it
precisely because it threatened the religious establishment. By the 15th century, religious
authorities across the Islamic world (not just in the Ottoman Empire) had set up high
barriers to entry. The largest of these barriers was the years of training required to know
various religious texts and interpretations of those texts. These barriers raised the status
of the religious elite, further entrenching the “high-λ, high-q” equilibrium. The printing
press threatened to undermine these barriers and the equilibrium they helped uphold. Had
printing become widespread, a much larger share of the population would have had access
to the great religious and non-religious texts of the Islamic world (and beyond). This would
have undermined one of the very features that gave Muslim religious authorities the power
to legitimate in the first place. Hence, as our model predicts, heavy restrictions were placed
on this vastly important technology.
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Muslim religious authorities had good reason to fear the spread of printing. They only
needed to look to Europe, where the press helped facilitate one of the great movements
against Church power in the history of Christianity: the Protestant Reformation (Boerner,
Rubin and Severgnini 2020; Dittmar and Seabold 2020; Rubin 2014). Unlike Ottoman
religious authorities, the Church was not able to stop the spread of the printing press. The
reason why this was the case follows from the logic of the model. As noted in Section 3.5,
the Church had already lost much of its legitimating power in Europe prior to the spread of
printing. Alternative sources of legitimacy had emerged in the form of universities (which
provided a theoretical justification for monarchical rule) and parliaments (which brought
together elites who could legitimate rule in return for a seat at the political bargaining
table). By 1200 or so, religious authorities had lost their monopoly over the printed word
as well; book demand and supply was increasingly found in university towns and urban
centers (Buringh and Van Zanden 2009). As a result, there was little the Church could
have done to stop the spread of printing had it wanted to. By the mid-15th century,
Europe was in a “low-λ, low-q” equilibrium. Our model suggests that this should also
entail few restrictions on technology—at least those technologies that damage the capacity
of religious authorities to legitimate. The history of printing suggests that this was the
case.
The Christian world was hardly uniform in the degree to which religious legitimacy was
part of the broader political equilibrium. This was especially true after the Reformation,
which fundamentally undermined the role of religious authority in the ruling coalition (Ru-
bin 2017). This had consequences for the spread of science and technology. Bénabou, Ticchi
and Vindigni (2020) summarize many of the scientific and technological advances blocked
or suppressed by the Church, including the works of Galileo, the Copernican Revolution,
Newtonism, the Scientific Revolution, and technical education in schools. These restric-
tions were much more widely applied in Catholic areas than Protestant ones. According
to Mokyr (2016), it was the “culture of growth” supported by the Republic of Letters that
permitted the spread of the new, rational thinking of those like Bacon and Newton. While
the Republic of Letters was a pan-European phenomenon, there was little resistance in
the leading Protestant lands (England and the Dutch Republic). Meanwhile, even after
the first wave of industrialization, the Church attempted to limit secular education and
curriculum in schools (Squicciarini 2020).
In short, this extension helps explain both the technological and scientific reversal
of fortunes between Western Europe and the Middle East as well as the the divergence
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within Europe. In Protestant Europe, new inventions and scientific ideas were allowed
to spread relatively unimpeded. This is what the model predicts would be the case in a
“low-λ, low-q” equilibrium. The equilibrium in Catholic Europe was one of higher λ and q,
and as a result some (though certainly not all) scientific and technological advances were
suppressed. In the “high-λ, high-q” equilibrium that pervaded most of the medieval and
early modern Middle East (at least, after the 11th century), scientific and technological
advancements were even more restricted. Our model explains these outcomes not solely as
reflecting the desires of religious authorities, but also their place in their society’s broader
political-economy and cultural equilibria.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an explanation for an important historical phenomenon: the long
divergence between Middle Eastern and Western European economies from the year 1000
C.E. to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. We provide an explanation in terms of
a model of institutional and cultural change. In doing so, we unify prevailing theories based
on religious legitimacy, religious proscriptions, and decentralization of political power. In
the process, our model resolves many puzzles left unaddressed in the literature.
In the context of the long divergence, the model centers on the power dynamics of
rulers, clerics, and secular elites in framing institutions in a religious environment. It high-
lights three central historical features of these power dynamics: rulers derive legitimacy
from the religious elites, religious authorities impose proscriptions that impinge on eco-
nomic development, constraints on executive power and the decentralization of political
power have a fundamental role in inducing economic growth. Most importantly, the model
highlights how the institutions resulting from the power dynamics of rulers, clerics, and
secular elites interact with the spread of culture (religious beliefs) in civil society. Political
centralization interacts with religious legitimacy and religious proscriptions to determine
its long-run economic and political paths. Citizens remain religious or not, in the face
of religious proscriptions, depending on the feedback between religious institutions and
cultural evolution. Religious legitimacy to the political system depends crucially on the
prominence of religious values in society.
We intend this as an illustration of the explanatory power of a class of models centered
on some simple general and yet minimal components: institutions as the relative politi-
cal power of different groups in society to affect policy decisions, institutional change as
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a mechanism to internalize externalities and other distortions characterizing the equilib-
rium. in society, and the cultural profile of values and preferences in society as evolving
according to various socioeconomic incentives.21 The interdependence between institutions
and culture is a fundamental factor, jointly (along with technology) driving socio-economic
change in these models. Our model reveals how such interdependence has played a central
role in determining the long-run economic, religious, and institutional paths of societies.
21See Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2021); Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a); Bisin and Verdier
(2021); Persson and Tabellini (2021) for surveys of this class of models.
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A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3
In order to prove the three Lemmas of the main text, we solve the equilibrium, where the
ruler chooses the amount of religious infrastructures m so as to maximize the social welfare










[qURe(eRe) + (1− q)US (eS)] . (A.1)
The clerics and the individuals choose, respectively, αc and ei, i = Re, S to maximize their
utility. The equilibrium is denoted {τ(λ),m(λ), αc(λ), eS(λ), eRe(λ)}. Since λ ≤ 1, τ(λ) is
equal to τ ≡ τ and the remaining first-order conditions are:
−C ′(m)− λF ′(m) + λ · αc = 0
m−Ψ′(αc) = 0
(1− τRe)− (1 + φαc)eRe = 0
(1− τ)− (1 + φαc)eS = 0,
(A.2)
or after substitution: 









Assuming that the marginal cost functions C ′(.), F ′(.) and Ψ′(.) are increasing convex
functions (ie. C ′′′(.) ≥ 0, F ′′′(.) ≥ 0 and Ψ′′′(.) ≥ 0) with at least one of these cost
derivatives strictly convex), and the limit condition limx→∞ F
′′(x) > 1, and F ′′(0)Ψ′′(0) <
1, then the first two equations of (A.3) simply characterize a unique equilibrium couple
m(λ) > 0 and αc(λ) > 0 when
C′′(0)Ψ′′(0)




Lemma 1: Differentiating the previous first-order conditions, it is easy to note that
the optimal provision of religious infrastructure m(λ) > 0 and the effort of the clerics
αc(λ) > 0 are both increasing in λ and independent from θ and φ. This concludes the
proof of Lemma 1.







The equilibrium secular effort e∗S(λ) is decreasing in clerics activities α
∗
c and thus, it is
decreasing in λ. It is independent from φ and θ
Additionally, from the equation above, eRe(λ) increases with θ and decreases with φ.
The effect of αc(λ) on eRe(β, λ) is ambiguous. By deriving eRe(λ) with respect to αc, we
find that when θ > 1−τ
τ
φ, then eRe(λ) increases with αc(λ), in which case eRe(λ) increases
with λ. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3: The equilibrium tax base of the ruler writes as
E(λ) = q · eRe(λ) + (1− q) · es(λ), (A.5)
so
E(λ) =
1− τ + τθq · αc(λ)
1 + φαc(λ)
. (A.6)
By deriving the previous expression with respect to αc(λ), we find that the tax base is
increasing in the clerics’ effort if and only if q ≥ 1−τ
τθ
φ. Hence, when the previous condition
is satisfied, E(λ) is increasing in λ. Finally, from (A.6), E(λ) is increasing in q and θ, and
decreasing in φ. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
- First, we demonstrate that the optimization problem (4) rewritten below admits a unique











[qtUre(eRe(λt+1)) + (1− qt)Us (es(λt+1))] . (A.7)







{Ur(m) + λtŨc(m) + (1− λt)
[








Ur(m) = τE(m)− C(m)









In the optimization problem (A.8), the choice of the religious infrastructure m is made by a
ruler able to commit to the provision of m, and therefore internalizing the two externalities




= λt [α̃c(m)− F ′(m)]−C ′(m)+ τE ′(m)+(1−λt)[qŨ ′Re(m)+(1−q)Ũ ′S(m)]. (A.10)
When C(.) and F (.) are sufficiently convex, the function W is concave in m, and the
previous optimization admits a unique solution m̃(λt) ≥ 0.
Note that αc(λ) = α̃c(m(λ)), Ui(ei(λ)) = Ũi(m(λ)) for i = {Re, S}, and Uc(m(λ), αc(λ)) =
Ũc(m(λ)). Given that m̃(λt) maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are inter-
nalized, the solution λt+1 of the optimization problem (4), should be such as to induce an
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equilibrium choice m (λt+1) as close to m̃(λt) as possible:
λt+1 =

λ s.t m(λ) = m̃(λt) if m̃(λt) ∈ (m(0),m(1))
1 if m̃(λt) > m(1)
0 if m̃(λt) < m(0).
(A.11)
When the clerics have power λt+1 given by (A.11), institutions are designed for t + 1 so
as to induce a choice m(λt+1) in that period that maximizes the social welfare of period
t. Given that m(λ) is increasing in λ,this solution λt+1 of problem (4) is unique and the
institutional dynamics are well defined.
- In the second step of the proof, we demonstrate that there exists a threshold q(λt)
such that if qt > q, then λt+1 > λt. Otherwise, λt+1 ≤ λt.
In order to demonstrate this claim, we first show the following intermediary result:
Lemma 6 λt+1 > λt if and only if m̃(λt) > m(λt).
Proof: Indeed, m̃(λt) > m(λt) means that if the ruler had the capacity to commit,
in period t, to provide religious infrastructures m, then he would chooses a level m̃(λt)
strictly above what he actually provides in equilibrium. Since m(.) is an increasing function
(Lemma 1), we deduce that λt+1 is such that λt+1 > λt.
22QED.










τ + (1− λt)
[






Proof: From the proof of Lemma 1 above, the first-order condition associated with
the determination of m(λ) is:
λtα̃c(m)− C ′(m) = 0, (A.13)
given that α̃c(m) = ψ
′−1(m).
22When an interior solution exists, λt+1 solves m̃(λt) = m(λt+1). Hence, if m̃(λt) > m(λt) then λt+1 > λt.
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H(m) = τ · E ′(m) + (1− λ)[qŨ ′Re(m) + (1− q)Ũ ′S(m)]}.
Given the two FOCs above, we deduce that m̃(λt) > m(λt) if and only if H(m(λt)) > 0.
We show that condition H(m(λt)) > 0 is equivalent to a condition over the possible values
of q.
E ′(m) = q · deRe
dm










U ′Re(m) = eRe(m)
[







1− τ + τθα̃c(m)
1 + φα̃c(m)
[
θτ − φ · 1
2

































= τ · (qτθ − (1− τ)φ) + (1− λ)G(m)
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and
G(m) = q(1− τ + τθα̃c(m))
[
θτ (1 + φα̃c(m))−
φ
2

















Then the condition H(m)− λF ′(m) ≥ 0 writes as














− λF ′(m) ≥ 0
or using αc(λ) = α̃c(m(λ)) = Ψ










τ + (1− λ)
[






and αc(λ) is an increasing function of λ. We conclude that m̃(λt) > m(λt) if and only if
q > q(λt).QED.
Combining the results established in Lemmas 6 and 7, it follows that λt+1 > λt if and
only if q > q(λt).
Finally, from (A.21), we deduce that q(λt) is decreasing in θ and φ. This concludes the
proof of the first point of Proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
As mentioned in the main text, cultural dynamics are modeled as purposeful inter-generational
transmission (Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bisin and Verdier (2017)), through parental social-
ization and imitation of society at large. Direct vertical socialization to the parent’s trait
i ∈ {Re, S} occurs with probability di. If a child from a family with trait i is not directly
socialized, which occurs with probability 1− di, he/she is horizontally/obliquely socialized
by picking the trait of a role model chosen randomly in the population. The probability
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Pij that a child in group i is socialized to trait j writes as:Pii = di + (1− di)qiPij = (1− di)qj (A.22)
with qRe = qt and qS = 1− qt. Let Vij(λt) = Ui(ej(λt)) denote the utility to a cultural
trait i parent of a type j child, with i, j ∈ {Re, S}. We denote the paternalistic bias
of a parent of type i as ∆Vi(λt) = Vii(λt) − Vij(λt), for j 6= i. The socialization cost






> 0 (ie. hRe(dRe,m) is increasing convex in dRe) and
the Inada conditions hRe(0,m) =
∂hRe(0,m)
∂dRe




Similarly, the socialization cost hS(dS) of a parent of type S satifies h
′
S(dS) ≥ 0; h′′S(dS) > 0
(ie. hS(dS) is increasing convex in dS (ie. ), and hS(0) = h
′




Furthermore, to reflect the fact religious infrastructures may enter as a complementary






≤ 0, (ie. m affects negatively the cost and the marginal cost of socialization
of religious parents). Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), direct socialization d∗Re of religious
parents is the solution to the following socialization problem:
max
dRe
−hRe(dRe,mt) + PReRe · VReRe(λt) + PReS · VRe S(λt), (A.23)




−hS(dS) + PSS · VSS(λt) + PSRe · VSRe(λt), (A.24)





= (1− qt)∆VRe(λt) and h′S(d∗S) = qt∆Vs(λt)
which can be rewritten as d∗Re (qt, λt) = DRe((1 − qt)∆VRe(λt),m(λt)) and d∗S (qt, λt) =
DS(qt∆VS(λt)).
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Note that by the Inada conditions on hRe (·, ·), d∗Re ∈ [0, 1] , and DRe(0,m) = 0. As well
















Similarly the Inada conditions on hS(·) ensure that d∗S ∈ [0, 1] , DS(0) = 0. As well







Using the Law of Large Numbers, one easily obtains the intergenerational evolution of
the frequency of the religious trait qt in the population as
qt+1 = qt · PReRe + (1− qt) · PSRe
or after substitution of (A.22) and the values of d∗Re and d
∗
S,
qt+1 − qt = qt(1− qt){d∗Re (qt, λt)− d∗S (qt, λt)}. (A.25)
As mentioned in the main text, in equation (A.25), the term
D(qt, λt) = d
∗
Re (qt, λt)− d∗S (qt, λt)
= DRe [(1− qt)∆VRe(λt),m(λt)]−DS [qt∆VS(λt)]
can be interpreted as the relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the popu-
lation. This term is frequency dependent (ie. depends on the state of the population
qt). Moreover simple inspection shows that D(qt, λt) is a decreasing function of qt, with
D(0, λt) = DRe [∆VRe(λt),m(λt)] > 0 and D(1, λt) = −DS [∆VS(λt)] < 0. From this it
follows that there exists a unique threshold q∗(λt) ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(q∗(λt), λt) = 0 (A.26)
Inspection of equation (A.25) and the fact that D(qt, λt) is a decreasing function of qt
provides immediately that qt+1 < qt if and only if qt > q
∗(λt), proving therefore proposition
in the main text. QED.
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A.4 Comparative statics on the cultural threshold q∗(λt)
The relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait D(qt, λt) is affected by the institutional
environment λt, as this variable interacts with the process of parental cultural transmission
both through paternalistic motivations ∆Vi(λt), and through the provision of religious
infrastructures mt = m(λt) as a complementary input to religious family socialization.
Therefore the dependence of the threshold q∗(λt) on the institutional environment λt and
the comparative statics on the parameters θ and φ depends on how the relative ”cultural
fitness” D(qt, λt) of the religious trait is affected by changes in such features.
It is first useful to note that with the quadratic specification for the utility functions
Ui(.) of workers, the paternalistic motives .∆VRe(λt) and ∆VS(λt) are equal and take a
simple form. Indeed we have:VReRe(λ) =
(1−τRe)2
2(1+φαc(λ))














Similarly, we find thatVSS(λ) =
(1−τ)2
2(1+φαc(λ))













Thus posing ∆V (λ) = (τθαc(λ))
2
2(1+φαc(λ))
, we get ∆VRe(λ) = ∆VS(λ) = ∆V (λ) and the relative
”cultural fitness” of the religious trait D(qt, λt) rewrites as:
D(qt, λt) = DRe [(1− qt)∆V (λt),m(λt)]−DS [qt∆V (λt)]
Now, considering the functions DRe(x, y) and DS(z) that respectively characterize the
optimal socialization behavior of religious parents as
d∗Re (qt, λt) = DRe [(1− qt)∆V (λt),m(λt)] , and d∗S (qt, λt) = DS(qt∆VS(λt))
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evaluated respectively at x = (1− q)∆V (λ) and y = m(λ), and z = q∆VS(λ).
Differentiation of (A.26) then provides with d∗ (λt) = d
∗
Re (q


















(q∗(λt), λt) < 0,
∂q∗
∂λt
has the sign of the numerator. This numerator is com-
posed of two terms reflecting the two channels through which the institutional environment
λt affects cultural transmission. The first term K(λt) = [εRe(q
∗, λt)− εS(q∗, λt)] d∗ (λt) ·
∆V ′(λt)
∆V (λt)
is the paternalistic motive channel. As ∆V ′(λt) > 0, both types of parents in-
crease the intensity of socialization to their own traits. The sign of K(λt) depends on the
relative sensitivity of parents’ socialization to paternalistic motives. It is positive when
εRe(q
∗, λt) > εS(q
∗, λt), namely when the socialization rate of religious parents d
∗
Re is more
sensitive to paternalistic motives than the one of secular parents d∗S.
The second term ∂DRe
∂m
·m′(λt) is positive. It reflects the fact that by promoting reli-
gious infrastructures that enter as complementary inputs in the socialization process of the
religious trait, an increase in the clerics weight λt makes the religious trait to be relatively
more successfully transmitted than the secular trait.
From this discussion it follows that when religious parents’ socialization efforts are more
sensitive to paternalistic motives than secular parents (ie. εRe(q, λt) > εS(q, λt)) , and (or)
when religious infrastructures are strong enough complementary inputs to socialization to
the religious trait, then the numerator of (A.71) is positive and q∗(λt) is increasing in λt.
As can be seen from (A.28) and (A.29), a change in the other parameters θ (the effi-
ciency of the clerics) and φ (the restrictiveness of religious proscriptions) affects the relative
cultural fitness of the religious trait only through their induced changes on the paternalistic

















When religious parents are more sensitive to paternalistic motives than secular parents,
one has K(λt) > 0 and a positive shift in θ (negative shift of φ) leads to a higher value of
q∗(λt). This provides the comparative statics discussion on q
∗(λt) in the main text. QED.
• Example with constant elasticity socialization cost functions:
























the cultural dynamics equation (6), we deduce that:




ηre − (qt∆V (λt))
1
ηs }, (A.33)
which admits two unstable steady states q = 0 and q = 1, and a unique interior attractor,












given that ηS ≥ ηre, we deduce that q∗(λt) is increasing in θ, λt, and decreasing in φ.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The likelihood of reaching the theocratic equilibrium is increasing in θ: From Proposition
1, q(.) is decreasing in θ. From Proposition 2, q∗(.) is increasing in θ. Hence, the measure of
parameters for which there is a complementarity between the spread of religious values and
an increase in the political weight of the clerics is larger. This explains why the likelihood
of reaching the theocratic equilibrium increases.
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The likelihood of reaching the theocratic equilibrium is decreasing in φ: From Propo-
sition 1, q(.) is increasing in φ. From Proposition 2, q∗(.) is decreasing in φ. Hence, the
measure of parameters for which there is a complementarity between the spread of religious
values and an increase in the political weight of the clerics is lower.
A.6 Proof of Lemmas 4 and 5:
In order to prove the two Lemmas, we first derive the tax base E. Since an individual of







with ε = ε0
1−αl





= 1− τi(1− αl)
ε0c
. (A.36)





{1− τ(1− qθαc)(1− αl)
ε0c
}. (A.37)
We are now able to solve the equilibrium. As a matter of simplification, we assume
throughout the extension that ψ(αc) is quadratic with ψ(αc) = α
2
c/2.
The first-order conditions associated with the determination of m(λ), αl(λ, β, q), and
αc(λ) are respectively: 
−(1− λ
2
)C ′(m) + λ
2
(αc − F ′(m)) = 0,
−αl + (1− β)τ ∂E∂αl ≤ 0, and
m− αc = 0.
(A.38)
The equilibrium is unique, when the marginal cost functions F ′(.) and C ′(.) are strictly
increasing convex functions and limm→∞ F
′′(m) > 1 > F ′′(0) + C ′′(0). Typically m(λ) =
αc(λ) = 0 when λ ≤ 2 C
′′(0)











when λ > 2 C
′′(0)
C′′(0)+1−F ′′(0) . From this, we deduce that m(λ) and αc(λ) are increasing in λ,
when F ′(m) < C ′(m) and is independent from β, θ, and φ. This concludes the proof of
Lemma 4.
Substituting (A.37) in the the second FOC above, we find










We deduce that αl(λ, β, q) is decreasing in β, λ q, θ and φ. This concludes the proof of
Lemma 5.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
As in the related proof of Proposition 1, we first demonstrate that the optimization, prob-





















The solution, denoted (m̃(λt, qt), α̃l(λt, qt)),
23 maximizes the social welfare when the exter-
nalities are internalized, with
Uc(m) = mαc(m)− ψ(αc(m))− F (m) =
1
2
m2 − F (m)
Ur(m,αl) = βt(τE(m,αl, qt)− C(m))− ραl
Ul(m,αl) = (1− βt)(τE(m,αl, qt)− C(m))−
α2l
2






{1− τ(1− qtθm)(1− αl)
ε0c
}. (A.42)
The previous optimization problem can be rewritten:
max
m,αl











In this optimization problem, the choices of both the religious provision m and of the effort
of the secular elite αl are made by a ruler who can commit, and hence that internalizes
the externalities detailed in the main text. We find that the solution (m̃(λt, qt), α̃l(λt, qt))





(m− F ′(m))− (1− λt
2




















We deduce the following lemma which characterizes the solution (m̃(λt, qt), α̃l(λt, qt)) of
(A.41)
Lemma 8 the solution (α̃l(λt, qt), m̃(λt, qt)) is uniquely determined when C(.), and F (m)
are sufficiently convex (ie W (m,αl, λt) is concave in m,αl).



























(1− F ′′(m))− (1− λt
2






when F ′′(m) > 1 and C ′′(m) > 2φ2, while:
∂2W
∂α2l




































































and ∆ > 0 when F ′′(m) > 1 + (θ+φ)
2
(cε0)
2 and C ′′(m) > 2φ2 +
(θ+φ)2
(cε0)
2 . Therefore W (m,αl, λt) is
concave in m,αl when C(.), and F (m) are sufficiently convex. (ie. when F








Now consider (m̃0 (qt) , α̃
0
l (qt)) = arg maxm,αlW (m,αl, 0) and m̃
1 = arg maxm,αlW (m,αl, 1).
m̃0 respectively the optimal level of religious infrastructure of (A.41)when the secular elite
(and the ruler) have full political power (ie. λ = 0), and when the society is in a theocracy
(the religious clerics weight is λ = 1). It is reasonable to make the following assumption:24
Assumption M: m̃0 (qt) < m̃
1 for all qt ∈ [0, 1]
namely that the clerics group always wish to have a higher level of religious infras-
tructures than the secular fraction of society (ruler and secular elite). We have then the
following result:
Lemma 9 Under assumption M , m̃ (λt, qt) is increasing in λt and qt.and α̃l (λt, qt) is
decreasing in λt and qt.




where m̃1 is determined by the condition m̃1 = Φ′(m̃1).
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Substitution of the FOC (A.44) into (A.46),one obtains when evaluated at the optimal









(m̃− F ′(m̃)) (A.49)






























































the sign of which is the same as the sign of ∂
2W
∂m∂λ
. Now under assumption M, one can see
from (A.49) that m̃ (λt, qt) is increasing in λt as long as m̃ (λt, qt) < m̃
1. Note first that
m̃ (1, qt) = m̃
1. Suppose then that there exists a value λ < 1 such that m̃ (λ, qt) = m̃
1.
From (A.44), and noting that
W (m,αl, λ) = λW (m,αl, 1) + (1− λ)W (m,αl, 0)
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+ (1− λ)∂W (m,αl, 0)
∂m
= 0
But m̃ (λ, qt) = m̃





= 0 at such
point. Hence to satisfy the previous equation, we should also have ∂W (m,αl,0)
∂m
= 0, which
in turn implies that m̃ (λ, qt) = m̃
0 (qt), a contradiction with assumption M . From this we
conclude that m̃ (λ, qt) < m̃
1 for all λ < 1 or m̃ (λ, qt) > m̃
1 for all λ < 1. The only case
consistent with assumption M is obviously that m̃ (λ, qt) < m̃
1 for all λ < 1. From this we
conclude that under assumption M, ∂
2W
∂m∂λ
evaluated at m̃ (λ, qt) , α̃l (λ, qt) is positive and
therefore ∂m̃
∂λt
> 0 (ie. religious infrastructures m̃ (λt, qt) is increasing in the clerics’ political
weight λt).














< 0 under assumption M (ie. the tax enforcement effort of the secular elite
α̃l (λt, qt) is decreasing in the clerics’ weight λt).





































In order to simplify the problem, we make the following assumption on the higher bound
αl:
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Before going further with the proof, we establish this intermediary result:
Lemma 10 Under Assumption A, αl(λ, β = 0) = αl for any (λ, q) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Proof: In order to prove Lemma 10, we need to write the first-order derivative of the
utility of the secular elites with respect to αl is:
∂Ul
∂αl




Hence, when β = 0, under Assumption A, ∂Ul
∂αl
> 0 for any αl ∈ [0, αl] and for any
(λ, q) ∈ [0, 1]2, so αl(λ, β = 0, q) = αl for any (λ, q) ∈ [0, 1]2. This concludes the proof of
the Lemma. QED.
Since (α̃l(λt, qt), m̃(λt, qt)) maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are in-
ternalized, (λt+1, βt+1) solves the optimization problem (10) when:m̃(λt, qt) = m(λt+1), andα̃l(λt, qt) = αl(λt+1, βt+1, qt) (A.51)
Indeed, when the clerics and the ruler have power λt+1 and βt+1, institutions are designed
for t+1 so as to induce a choice m(λt+1) and αl(λt+1, βt+1, qt) in that period that maximizes
the social welfare under the institutional framework of period t. It remains to be proven
that the solution (λt+1, βt+1) of the system (A.51) is unique. Consider the following system
with two unknown variables x and y:m̃(λt, qt) = m(x), andα̃l(λt, qt) = αl(x, y, qt), (A.52)
Consider first the case where an interior solution exists. Since the functionm(.) is increasing
in its argument, from Lemma 4, there exists a unique value x(λt, qt) ∈ [0, 1] such that
m̃(λt, qt) = m(x). Substituting x(λt, qt) in the second equation, we find:
α̃l(λt, qt) = αl(x(λt, qt), y, qt), (A.53)
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By definition, α̃l(λt, qt) ∈ [0, αl]. Furthermore, as αl(x(λt, qt), y, qt) is decreasing in
y from Lemma 5, under Assumption A, αl(x(λt, qt), 1, qt) = 0 ≤ αl(x(λt, qt), y, qt) ≤
αl(x(λt, qt), 0, qt) = αl. Hence, applying the theorem of intermediate values, there exists
a single vector (x(λt, qt), y(λt, qt)) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that (A.51) holds. We have demonstrated
that the system (A.51) admits a unique interior solution, when this solution exists.
An interior solution does not always exists, as it can be that m̃(λt, qt) > m(λt+1)
or m̃(λt, qt) < m(λt+1) for any λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. In these two cases, there is a single solution
(λt+1, βt+1) to the optimization problem (10), which is the unique vector such that (m(λt+1),
αl(λt+1, βt+1, qt)) maximizes (A.41). Indeed, when m̃(λt, qt) > m(λt+1), then λt+1 = 1, and
βt+1 solves
α̃l(λt, qt) = αl(1, βt+1, qt) (A.54)
for βt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. As αl(1, βt+1, qt) is decreasing in βt+1 from Lemma 5, under Assump-
tion ??, αl(1, 1, qt) = 0 ≤ αl(1, βt+1, qt) ≤ αl(1, 0, qt) = αl. Applying the theorem of
intermediate values, there exists a single βt+1 ∈ [0, 1] such that α̃l(λt, qt) = αl(1, βt+1, qt)
The reasoning is similar when m̃(λt, qt) < m(λt+1) for any λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]: λt+1 = 0 and
there is a unique solution βt+1 ∈ [0, 1] to the equation α̃l(λt, qt) = αl(0, βt+1, qt). From this
we conclude that the optimization problem (10) admits a unique solution (λt+1, βt+1).
We are now going to demonstrate that there exists a threshold qd(λt) such that if
qt > qd(λt), then λt+1 > λt. Otherwise, λt+1 ≤ λt. In order to demonstrate this claim, we
will show the following intermediary result:
Lemma 11 λt+1 > λt if and only if m̃(λt, qt) > m(λt).
Proof: Indeed, m̃(λt, qt) > m(λt) means that in (A.41), the ruler would want to
commit to a provision level m̃(λt, qt) strictly above what is provided in equilibrium. Since
m(.) is increasing in λ (Lemma 4), we deduce that when the political weight λt+1, that
decentralizes m̃(λt, qt) is such that m̃(λt, qt) = m(λt+1), one has that λt+1 > λt. A similar
reasoning can be applied for the corners when λt+1 = 1 when m̃(λt, qt) > m(1) or λt+1 = 0
when m̃(λt, qt) < m(0). QED.
Lemma 12 m̃(λt, qt) > m(λt) if and only if q > qd(λt), with qd (λt) is defined as the

















Proof: Given that m̃(λt, qt) is increasing in qt, the condition m̃(λt, qt) > m(λt) is
equivalent to qt > qd(λt) ∈ [0, 1] with qd(λt) defined such
m̃(λt, qd(λt)) = m(λt) when m̃(λt, 0) ≤ m(λt) ≤ m̃(λt, 1)
qd(λt) = 0 when m̃(λt, 0) > m(λt)
qd(λt) = 1 when m̃(λt, 1) < m(λt)
More specifically, the first-order condition associated with the determination of m(λ) is:
λ
2
(m− F ′(m))− (1− λ
2
)C ′(m) = 0. (A.56)
The first-order condition for the determination of m̃(λ, q) writes as
λ
2
(m− F ′(m))− (1− λ
2






























φ[1− τ(1− qtθm)(1− α̃l(λt, qt))
ε0c


























Denote Σ (λ, q) the function






Given that α̃l(λ, q) is a decreasing function of q, Σ (λ, q) is an increasing function of q. Now
condition (A.59)is equivalent to qt > qd (λt) with





− 1} > 0





− 1} < 0
qd (λt) = q ∈ (0, 1) such that Σ (λt, q) = 0 otherwise














and m̃(λt) > m(λt) if and only if q > qd(λt). We deduce that qd(λt) is increasing in φ and
decreasing in θ and λt. Combining the results established in Lemma 11 and Lemma 12,
we get that λt+1 > λt if and only if q > qd(λt). QED.
Finally, we demonstrate that there exists a threshold q̃d(λt, βt) such that if qt >
q̃d(λt, βt), then βt+1 > βt. Otherwise, βt+1 ≤ βt. In order to demonstrate this claim,
we proceed in two steps. First, we show the following result:
Lemma 13 βt+1 > βt if and only if α̃l(λt, βt) < αl(λt+1, βt), with
λt+1 =

λ s.t m(λ) = m̃(λt) if m̃(λt) ∈ (m(0),m(1))
1 if m̃(λt) > m(1)
0 if m̃(λt) < m(0).
(A.61)
Proof: Indeed, α̃l(λt, qt) < αl(λt+1, βt, qt) means that – given that the clerics have an
optimal weight λt+1 – if the ruler could, he would wish the secular elite to provide a lower
enforcement effort. Since αl(λt+1, qt, .) is a decreasing function of βt, the ruler increases his
own political weight βt, so that the secular elite provides less effort: βt+1 > βt. QED.
Lemma 14 There exists a threshold q̃d(λt, βt) ∈ [0, 1] such that α̃l(λt, qt) < αl(λt+1, βt, qt)
if and only if q > q̃d(λt, βt), with q̃d(λt, 1) = 1 and λt+1 given in (A.61).
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Proof: The first-order condition associated with the determination of α̃l(λt, qt) is:
− α̃l(λt, qt)− ρ+
τ 2(1− qtθαc( m̃(λt, qt)))
cε0(1 + φαc( m̃(λt, qt))
= 0 (A.62)
Given that m̃(λt, qt) = m(λt+1), this rewrites as




The first-order condition associated with the determination of αl(λt+1, βt, qt) is:




Hence, the inequality α̃l(λt, qt) < αl(λt+1, βt, qt) is verified when
ρ > βt
τ 2(1− qtθαc(m̃(λt, qt))
cε0(1 + φαc(m̃(λt, qt))
, (A.65)
Now the RHS of (A.65) is decreasing in qt as m̃(λt, qt) is an increasing function of qt so
there exists a unique threshold q̃d(λt, βt) such that if q > q̃d(λt, βt), then (A.65) is satisfied.
Otherwise, it is not satisfied. Moreover given that the RHS of (A.65) is decreasing in λt
(as m̃(λt, qt) and αc(m̃(λt, qt) are increasing in λt), and increasing in βt, it follows that the
threshold q̃d(λt, βt) is decreasing in λt and increasing in βt. QED.
Combining the results established in Lemmas 12 and 14, we have demonstrated that
βt+1 > βt if and only if q > q̃d(λt, βt).
Summarizing, we have demonstrated the followings:
• The optimization problem (10) admits a unique solution (λt+1, βt+1) ∈ [0, 1]2.
• there exists a threshold q̃d(λt, βt) such that if q > q̃d(λt, βt) then βt+1 > βt. Otherwise,
βt+1 ≤ βt.
• There exists a threshold qd(λt) such that if qt > qd(λt), then λt+1 > λt. Otherwise,
λt+1 ≤ λt.
• q̃d(λt, βt) is decreasing in λt and increasing in βt. and qd(λt) is decreasing in λt.
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Finally, q̃d(λt, 1) = 1 because in equilibrium, the secular elite provides no effort,
αl(λt, 0, qt) = 0 and have zero utility. Hence, an epsilon increase in their political weight
1− βt will increase the social welfare by increasing both the utility of the ruler, and of the
secular elite. This concludes the proof of Proposition 4. QED.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
As in the proof of Proposition 2, we first deduce from the maximization program (A.23)
that d∗Re = DRe((1− qt)∆VRe,m) with DRe(0,m) = 0, and DRe(·, ·) an increasing function
of both arguments (1− qt)∆VRe and m. Also from (A.24) d∗S = DS(qt∆VS) is an increasing
function of qt∆VS.
Parents do not know the realization of their children’s capacity c to escape taxation
when cultural transmission occurs. Consequently, the paternalistic motives have to be
amended to involve expectations of the induced utilities with respect such capacity c.






























with ε = ε0/(1− αl(λ, β, q)). Hence,
∆VRe(λ, β, q) =
(τθαc(λ))
2(1− αl(λ, q, β))
2cε0(1 + φαc(λ))
. (A.67)
Similarly, we find that
∆VS(λ, β, q) = ∆VRe(λ, β, q) = ∆V (λ, β, q) =
(τθαc(λ))
2(1− αl(λ, β, q))
2cε0(1 + φαc(λ))
. (A.68)
Again the result that ∆Vs(λ, β, q) = ∆Vre(λ, β, q) follows from the quadratic specification
of the expected payoff functions. Note as well that because αl(λ, β, q) depends on q (ie. is
a decreasing function in q), ∆V (λ, β, q) also depends on q and is an increasing function of
q
Now, the cultural dynamics write as
qt+1 − qt = qt(1− qt)D(λt, βt, qt). (A.69)
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with
D(λt, βt, qt) = d
∗
Re − d∗S = DRe [(1− qt)∆V (λt, βt, qt),m(λt)]−DS [qt∆V (λt, βt, qt)]
can be interpreted as the relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population.
Again simple inspection shows
D(λt, βt, 0) = DRe [∆V (λt, βt, 0),m(λt)] > 0
and
D(λt, βt, 1) = −DS [∆V (λt, βt, 1)] < 0
From this it follows that there exists a threshold q∗d(λt, βt) ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(λt, βt, q
∗
d(λt, βt)) = 0 (A.70)
Compared to the benchmark model, D(λt, βt, qt) may not be always decreasing function
in qt, as ∆V (λt, βt, qt) is increasing in qt and the uniqueness of the threshold q
∗
d(λt, βt) is
not necessarily ensured. When however (1− q)∆V (λ, β, q) is a decreasing function of q,25
simple inspection shows that D(λt, βt, qt) is a decreasing function of qt and that qt+1 < qt
if and only if qt > q
∗
d(λt, βt), as stated in proposition 5.
In such a case, defining again the sensitivity of parents’ socialization to paternalistic

























(λt, βt, q∗d(λt, βt))
(A.71)
with d∗ (λt, βt) = d
∗
Re ((λt, βt, q
∗
d(λt, βt)) = d
∗
S ((λt, βt, q
∗
d(λt, βt)), the equilibrium commun
socialization rate at the threshold q∗d(λt, βt). Again the numerator is composed of two terms
reflecting the two channels through which the institutional environment λt affects cultural













motive channel. As ∆V ′λ(λt, βt) > 0, the sign of K(λt) depends on the relative sensitivity
of parents’ socialization to paternalistic motives. It is positive when εRe > εS, namely when
the socialization rate of religious parents d∗Re is more sensitive to paternalistic motives than
the one of secular parents d∗S. The second positive term
∂DRe
∂m
·m′(λt) reflects the positive
effect of promoting religious infrastructures as complementary inputs in the transmission
process of the religious trait.
As in the benchmark model, it follows again that when religious parents’ socialization
efforts are more sensitive to paternalistic motives than secular parents (ie. εRe > εS) , and
(or) when religious infrastructures are strong enough complementary inputs to socialization
to the religious trait, then the numerator of (A.71) is positive and q∗d(λt, βt) is increasing
in λt.
• Example with constant elasticity socialization cost functions











with ηs ≥ ηre > 0 and χ′(m) > 0. The optimal socialization efforts are such that:d∗Re(qt, λt) = ((1− qt)∆V (λt, βt, qt))
1
ηre · [χ (λt)]
1
ηre




and in this constant elasticity specification εRe − εS = 1ηre −
1
ηs
≥ 0. Cultural dynamics are
described as:
qt+1− qt = qt(1− qt){((1− qt)∆V (λt, βt, qt))
1
ηre · [χ (λt)]
1




which admits two unstable steady states q = 0 and q = 1, and in general a unique interior













ηSηre · [χ (λt)]
1
ηre (A.75)
From the last equation, and given that ηS > ηre, we deduce that q
∗
d(λt, βt) is increasing
in θ, λt and βt and decreasing in φ. This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
• Joint dynamics with q∗d(λt, βt) independent from βt.
Consider the case where the socialization cost functions of religious and secular parents









with η > 0
from (A.75), it is immediate that the threshold q∗d(λt, βt) is given by:




1 + [χ (λt)]
and is therefore independent from βt. In such a case the dynamics of λt and qt are such
that: λt+1 > λt if and only if qt > qd(λt), and qt+1 > qt if and only if qt < q
∗
d(λt) They are
then decoupled from the dynamics of βt and follow the same pattern as in the benchmark
model. Consequently, depending on the initial conditions (λ0, q0), (λt, qt) converge towards
a theocratic regime (1, q∗d(1)) or a secular regime (0, q
∗
d(0)) . Associated to these dynamics,
the dynamics of political centralization then converges towards strong state centralization
with β∗1 = β̃d(1, q
∗
d(1)), or weak state centralization β
∗





A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
We consider that the policymaker chooses the amount of religious infrastructures m, and
level of technology αI ∈ [0, αmax] to maximize
W (m,αI , αc, λ, q) = (1− λ) [Ur(m,αI , q)] + λUc(m,αc)
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while the cleric maximizes Uc(m,αc) with respect to αc with
Ur(m,αI , q) = τE(αI , αc, q)− C(m)




(we assume for convenience that the cost of the religious infrastructures C(m) is paid as a
lump-sum cost by all segments of society) with






where religious legitimacy is decreasing in the innovation effort: θ = θ(αI) = θ0− kαI . We
assume kαmax < θ0 < 2kαmax Given the institutional framework λ, one immediately gets
αc = m, − (1− λ)C ′(m) + λ(αc − F ′(m)) = 0
and αI determined by the FOC:








This gives the equilibrium values m (λ) such that (1 − λ)C ′(m) + λF ′(m) = λm. (As
usual we assume that C ′′′(m) > 0, F ′′′(m) > 0, C ′(0) = F ′(0) = 0 and limm→∞ F
′′(m) >
1 > F ′′(0) to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium for all λ ∈ [0, 1] . Note that
m (λ) > 0 if and only if λ > C
′′(0)
C′′(0)+1−F ′′(0)). This provides also αc(λ) = m (λ), and
αI (λ, q) = αI (m (λ) , q). When positive, it is also easy to see that m (λ) is an increasing
function of λ (as we assume that C ′(m) > F ′(m)).
As in the related proofs of Propositions 1 and 4, we first demonstrate that the opti-
mization problem (15) admits a unique solution λt+1 ∈ [0, 1]:
max
λt+1
(1− λt) [Ur(m(λt+1), αI(λt+1), qt)] + λtUc(m (λt+1) , αc(λt+1))) (A.76)




W̃ (m,αI , λt, qt) = (1− λt) [Ur(m,αI , qt)] + λtUc(m), (A.77)
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where the solution, denoted (m̃(λt, qt), α̃I(λt, qt)) maximizes the social welfare when the
externalities are internalized, so given that Uc(m) = Uc(m,αc(m)) =
1
2
m2 − F (m), as
αc(m) = m. Ur(m,αI , qt) = τE(m,αI , qt)− C(m), with
E(m,αI , qt) =
αI
1 + φm
{1− τ(1− qt [θ0 − kαI ]m)
ε0c
}. (A.78)
We also assume that in the previous optimization problem, the choices of both the re-
ligious provision m and of the effort of the innovators αI are made by a ruler who has
a policy commitment capacity, internalizing the externalities associated with the policy





























From the second FOC equation we again get the optimal level of technology:





































(m,αI (m, qt) , λt, qt) ≤ 0 and m ≥ 0
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When C(m) and F (m) are sufficiently convex, Θ (m) is decreasing in m. Moreover given
that








τqt [θ0 − kαmax]
ε0c
]
we have Θ (0) > 0 when








Thus m̃(λt, qt) = 0 for qt ≤ q and m̃(λt, qt) > 0 for qt > q. Substitution provides α̃I(λt, qt) =





















τ [θ0 − kαI ]
ε0c
> 0

















≤ qt [θ0 − kαI (m (λt) , qt)] (A.80)
qt [θ0 − kαI (m (λt) , qt)] is an increasing function of qt and decreasing function of λt. Con-
dition (A.80) can be rewritten as a threshold condition qt ≥ qI(λt) for qI(λt) ∈ (0, 1] with
qI(λt) is a decreasing function of λt.
Summarizing we get m̃(λt, qt) ≥ m (λt) if and only if qt ≥ qI(λt) for qI(λt) ∈ (0, 1] .
Since (m̃(λt, qt), α̃I(λt, qt)) maximizes the social welfare when the externalities are in-
ternalized, λt+1 solves the optimization problem (15) when:m̃(λt, qt) = m(λt+1), andα̃I(λt, qt) = αI (m(λt+1), qt) (A.81)
Given the first equality, it is immediate to see that the second equality is automatically
satisfied from the definition of αI (m, qt) . Given this the institutional dynamics of λt is
uniquely determined. Observe as well that m̃(λt, qt) ≥ m (λt) if and only if qt ≥ qI(λt).
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This can be rewritten as m(λt+1) ≥ m (λt) if and only if qt ≥ qI(λt). Given the fact that
m (λ) is increasing in λ, we deduce the following result:
λt+1 ≥ λt if and only if qt ≥ qI(λt)
This concludes the proof of Proposition 6.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 7
The paternalistic motives have to be amended to take into account the fact that produc-
tivity is optimally determined by the endogenous choice of technology: More precisely we




































Similarly, we find that





Again the result that ∆Vs(λ, β, q) = ∆Vre(λ, β, q) follows from the quadratic specification
of the expected payoff functions. Note as well that because αI (λ, q)) depends on q (ie. is
a decreasing function in q), ∆V (λ, β, q) also depends on q and is decreasing function of q
Now, the cultural dynamics write as
qt+1 − qt = qt(1− qt)D(λt, qt). (A.85)
with
D(λt, qt) = d
∗
Re − d∗S = DRe [(1− qt)∆V (λt, qt),m(λt)]−DS [qt∆V (λt, qt)]
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can be interpreted as the relative ”cultural fitness” of the religious trait in the population.
Again simple inspection shows
D(λt, 0) = DRe [∆V (λt, 0),m(λt)] > 0
and
D(λt, 1) = −DS [∆V (λt, 1)] < 0
From this it follows that there exists a threshold q∗I (λt) ∈ (0, 1) such that
D(λt, q
∗
I (λt)) = 0 (A.86)
Compared to the benchmark model, D(λt, qt) may not be always decreasing function in qt,
as ∆V (λt, qt) is decreasing in qt and the uniqueness of the threshold q
∗
d(λt) is not necessarily
ensured. When however q∆V (λ, q) is increasing function of q,26 simple inspection shows
that D(λt, qt) is a decreasing function of qt and that qt+1 < qt if and only if qt > q
∗
I (λt, βt),
as stated in proposition 7. QED.
26This is ensured when 1 > τ
2
cε0
max
(
θ
φ , 1
)
79
